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Congress, Public Values, and the Financing of
Private Choice
MARY L. HEEN*
This Article examines the financing dimension of private choice, with a focus on
Congress's taxing and spending decision-maing processes. The Article begins with
an overview of the financing and performance dimensions of privatization
decisions, followed by an analysis of how taxation relates to both dimensions.
Private choice can be financed individually, that is, paidfor by an individual's own
resources,facilitated by general tax reduction. Alternatively, private choice can be
financed collectively by using tax revenues (or borrowed funds) to payforprivately
provided goods and services. The tendency in political debate to conflate those two
forms of financing, as well as the failure to distinguish between financing and
performance, obscures important decisions about private choice and the
government's role in managing or monitoring collectively financed activities.
Congress coordinates its taxing and spending decisions through the budget process,
collectively determining what will be financed and performed through government
and what will be left to private choice. The courts generally defer to the taxing and
spending decisions made by Congress. Nevertheless, in the process of developing
this highly deferential approach, the U.S. Supreme Court historically has drawn
distinctions between taxes and other means of paying for or regulating the
production of goods and services. Although it can be quite difficult to distinguish
"taxes " or "revenue raising "from "userfees," "prices, "or "penalties, " they are
not constitutionally interchangeable. When the Court has interpreted express
limitations on Congress's taxing power, it has drawn distinctions similar to those
drawn in the privatization literature between individual and collective financing.
These doctrinal distinctions reflect the democratic values inherent in Congress's
taxing and spending powers.
Next, drawing from tax scholarship on tax expenditures, the Article develops the
argument that general tax reduction and targeted tax incentives differ in their
approach to financing. Targeted tax incentives subsidize certain legislatively
favored activities and, therefore, comport with the pattern ofprivatization typically
followed in the United States of retaining collective financing but delegating
performance to the private sector (as in government contracting or voucher
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programs). Collective financing keeps resources under some type of government
control, with collectively defined goals achieved through the use of either public or
private producers.
The Article concludes with a discussion of accountability issues with regard to both
financing and performance. Administrative lawyers and scholars are engaged in
studying new ways in which regulation, contracts, and contract monitoring may
respond to the accountability problems created by increased "contracting out" or
privatizing of government services. A parallel effort to study ways in which
increased monitoring of tax incentives can be achieved needs to be undertaken. Tax
incentives generally do not involve negotiated relationships between government
and private contractors, but typically involve tax reporting to the Internal Revenue
Service and oversight jurisdiction by the tax-writing committees. The delivery of
subsidies through the tax system can mask governmental funding levels and
allocations and obscure accountability for outcomes being funded. The use of tax
incentives as an alternative to discretionary spending by the government serves
privatization goals through their use of market incentives and private choice. How
to achieve greater political accountability for both the financing and performance
of tax incentives remains a central challenge. The Article ends with suggestionsfor
incremental ways to achieve such increased monitoring through budgetary and
oversight reforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress defines and accomplishes public purposes through the exercise of its
taxing and spending powers.' Differences over taxing and spending levels, which are
negotiated primarily through the legislative process,2 often reflect underlying
disagreements about the role and scope of government. 3 The political dynamics
involve raw budgetary conflicts, contested ideas about the value of collective versus
private choice,4 and deep differences in views about governmental competencies and
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States .... ).
2 The negotiation process involves key players from both the executive and legislative
branches, including the President and congressional leadership, and depending upon political
factors, it may involve an executive/legislative "summit" meeting and agreement to resolve
budgetary and tax issues. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
3 LIAM MURPHY & THoMAs NAGEL, THE MYTH OFOWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JuSTICE 6 (2002).
Disagreements over the legitimate scope of government benefit and constraint, and over the
way that scope is affected by individual rights, are likely to underlie differences over taxation,
even when they are not made explicit. These are disagreements about the extent and limits of
our collective authority over one another through our common institutions.
Id.
4 See, e.g., Mark H. Moore, Introduction to Symposium, Public Values in an Era of
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functions. These differences also underlie current political debates falling under the
general rubric of "privatization." 5
The term "privatization" has been used to include a broad array of political and
policy initiatives.6 Structurally, the choice between public and private7 involves the
two basic dimensions of financing and performance. 8 As noted by a scholar of
privatization initiatives, the financing dimension concerns the choice between
individual and collective financing: "Should we pay for some good or service
individually, out of our own resources, or should we pay for it collectively with funds
raised through one form or another of taxation?" 9 The performance dimension
involves the choice between governmental and nongovernmental production of goods
and delivery of services: "Should the good be produced or the service delivered by a
governmental organization or by a nongovernmental organization?"' 0 In the United
States, privatization has generally followed a pattern of "retaining collective financing
Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (2003).
5 See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accountingfor the New Religion, 116
HAv. L. REv. 1229, 1237-41 (2003). Although the United States has a long history of
partnerships between the public and private sectors, recent privatization efforts differ from past
patterns, according to Minow, in at least four important ways: 1) the use of direct financing and
joint ventures rather than reliance on public policies to facilitate private enterprises; 2) the reversal
of twentieth century trends toward expansion of the social safety net; 3) the use of market-style
language and concepts in the provision of social services combined with the assumption that
competition and individual choice are better, or more effective, than collective democratic
governance; and 4) the increased partnering with religious organizations themselves, and not just
their separate nonprofit social service agencies, to provide social services. Id. at 1240-41.
6 Privatization proposals originate from multi-faceted political efforts to make the public
sector more efficient, constrain its growth, or to downsize it. "Privatization" can refer to the
divestiture of government-owned-and-operated property, "contracting out" or outsourcing of
publicly provided goods and services, creation of public/private partnerships, or the removal of
certain constraints on private choice. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and
Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 456-62 (1988) (discussing the forms taken by privatization
proposals, including divestiture, leasing and "contracting out," improving service choices through
deregulation, vouchers, or increasing direct dollar choices through user fees or by increasing the
amount of money in private hands through tax reduction).
7 For discussion of the difficulties in using the terms "public" and "private," see, e.g.,
MARTHA MINow, PARTNERS, NOT RIvALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 29-35 (2002);
Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424
(1982) (observing that taxation began to be understood as part of public law only with the
development of theories of sovereignty in the seventeenth century, and that "[t]he emergence of the
market as a central legitimating institution brought the public/private distinction into the core of
legal discourse during the nineteenth century"); Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982). See also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,551 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role].
8 JoHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECIsION: PuBLIc ENDS, PRIvATE MEANS 7 (1989).
9 1d.
10 Id.
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but delegating delivery to the private sector."1
This Article examines the financing dimension of private choice with a focus on
Congress's taxing and spending decision-making processes. Increased private
performance can be paid for by individual resources, facilitated by general tax
reduction.12 Alternatively, private choice can be financed collectively by using tax
revenues (or borrowed funds) to pay for privately provided goods and services or by
using targeted tax incentives to stimulate private substitutes for public programs. 13
Although it can be difficult to distinguish between "taxes" and "prices," or even
between "taxing" and "spending," individual and collective financing are not
interchangeable. As argued in greater detail below, conflating them can obscure
important political decisions about private choice and the government's role in
managing or monitoring collectively financed activities. 14
Although the U.S. Constitution places few limitations on privatization, 15 it serves
as a "blueprint" to create an open political process for decision making about
governmental functions. 16 In political and economic discourse about privatization, the
line between the public and private sectors is sometimes drawn by reference to
"ownership,"' 17 and sometimes by other criteria such as the nature of the goods or
I1 Id. at 215. In the United States, aside from a limited number of asset sales, privatization has
more generally meant "enlisting private energies to improve the performance of tasks that would
remain in some sense public." Id. at 7. See also EuioTr D. SCLAR, You DON'T ALWAYS GET
WHAT You PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 6 (2000) (noting that "[p]rivatization
American style is essentially old-fashioned public contracting writ very large").
12 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT 229 (1988) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION] ("mhe two most important forms of
privatization in the United States have been deregulation and tax reduction.").
13 Stuart Butler, Privatizationfor Public Purposes, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
18, 20 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1987) ("The most complete form of privatization is
the... shifting of a function entirely out of government .... The second most complete form of
privatization is a combination of deregulation and tax incentives."). See discussion infra Part HI.
14 See discussion infra Part W.
15 See Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan HIL, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization,
46 AM. J. COMp. L. 481, 482 (Supp. 1998) (suggesting that the constitutional clause "that most
clearly stands in the way of privatization [is] the guarantee of a republican form of government,"
but noting that the Guarantee Clause has not been held judicially enforceable). Although
Professors Gillette and Stephan find little constitutional authority dealing directly with the
privatization process, they examine three areas where decisions to privatize encounter limitations
that in some sense might be termed "constitutional," focusing on "whether constitutional rules that
normally would apply only to governmental actors might apply to privatized activities," "federal
administrative law governing decisions by the federal government to contract out its functions,"
and state constitutional provisions affecting privatization. Id. at 482-83.
16 Id. at 482; see also Cass, supra note 6, at 497-502.
17 In countries other than the United States, the term generally refers to "selling government-
owned-and-operated businesses to private enterprise." Cass, supra note 6, at 450; see, e.g., DEER
Bos, PRIVATIZATION: A ThREOaRCAL TREATmENr 1-2 (1991) (discussing privatization in Western
[Vol. 65: 853
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services being provided, the receipt of public funds, or the public function of an
activity. 18
Through its role as a representative decision-making body, Congress collectively
defines "public" goals, purposes, and functions. Redrawn lines between what is
understood as public and private could have a significant impact on upcoming public
policy debates, including continuing discussions about taxes, 19 school choice,20
welfare policy and charitable choice,21 the budget deficit,22 and the future of the
social security system.23 Resolution of these major policy issues or, alternatively, the
European economies).
18 See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTNG INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTEREST AND
PuBLIc ACTION 6-7, 121 (1982) (distinguishing between public action in the political reah--
involvement of the citizen in civic and community affairs-and attending to one's private interests
through the pursuit of increased material welfare for oneself and one's family).
19 See, e.g., Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38.
20 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 1776-873
(providing assistance to enhance public school choice); Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 58 (2001) (expanding Coverdell
education savings accounts, I.R.C. § 530, to include qualified expenses of elementary and
secondary students at public, private, or religious schools). See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639,652 (2002) (upholding under an Establishment Clause challenge Cleveland's school
voucher program, which "provide[d] assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn,
direct[ed] government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice").
21 See, e.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1271, 1278-82 (2003); see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 35-38 (2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf [hereinafter THE
PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA] (discussing community and faith-based initiatives to
supplement existing charitable choice legislation); Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499
(Jan. 29, 2001) (establishing White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives);
Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29, 2001) (setting forth agency responsibilities
with respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (2000)
(permitting states to provide welfare-related services through contracts with charitable, religious,
and private organizations).
22 See, e.g., DANIEL SHAviRo, Do DEFcrrs MATTER? 65-150 (1997) (reviewing the debate in
economic literature about deficits); see also OFFICE OFMGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGETOFTHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. FISCAL YEAR 2005: OVERVIEW OF
THE PRESIDENT'S 2005 BUDGET 10 (2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/budgetpdfbudgetoverview.pdf (projecting a
$521 billion deficit for fiscal year 2004).
23 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SECURITY, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL
SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS 11-13 (2001), available at
http:/Iwww.commtostrengthensocsec.gov/reports/Final-report.pdf (presenting three plans for
2004]
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failure to resolve them over the next several years will have important implications for
how the government and the private sector address the country's economic and social
problems in the future.
As in the past, the terms and structure of those debates will be defined in part by
the resolution of more obscure tax and budget process choices. Congress coordinates
its taxing and spending decisions through the budget process. It is through this
process "that the Nation chooses what areas it wishes to leave to private choice and
what services it wants to provide through government." 24 Although often technically
complex in nature, decisions about tax and budgetary processes hold high stakes for
the transparency of our democratic decision-making processes over the next few
years. In politics, when and how the debate gets framed often determines the
outcome.
President George W. Bush, like President Ronald Reagan nearly twenty-five
years ago, proposed and encouraged a broad range of privatization initiatives, and in
this respect he continued and expanded the Reagan legacy. The Bush
Administration 25 also adopted certain modifications in the presentation of tax revenue
information in the budget, in ways similar to those proposed and partially adopted
during the Reagan Administration. 26 As suggested below, the two developments, one
representing core governmental philosophy and the other representing technical
changes in the budget presentation, were not unconnected as a matter of political
strategy. These changes have significant implications for debates about key public
policy issues.
The debates also raise more fundamental questions for our democratic polity. Do
public values represent something other than the aggregation of individual
preferences? What role should public deliberation play in shaping preferences? How
can public purposes best be achieved? In considering the complex public/private
relationships typical of privatization initiatives, lawmakers forge legislative responses
to these questions in varied contexts and, in the process, confront new questions of
political legitimacy and accountability.
The most complete form of privatization, in which both financing and
performance are transferred to private actors, also implies a shift from collective,
reforming social security and proposing individual accounts financed by diverting funds from
social security trust funds).
2 4 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISsION
ON BUDGEr CONCEPTS 11 (1967) (submitted to President Johnson by Commission Chairman
David M. Kennedy and fifteen commission members, including Charles Schultze and Carl Shoup).
25 Unless otherwise specified, references to the "Bush Administration" throughout the Article
are to the presidential administration of President George W. Bush, beginning in 2001, and not to
the administration of his father, President George Herbert Walker Bush, who was elected President
in 1988 after serving as Vice President during both terms of Ronald Reagan's presidency.
26 See discussion infra Part lI.A.
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public decision making to more individualized, private decision making.2 7
Privatization initiatives thus shift the locus of decision making. Privatization of both
financing and performance necessarily results in a smaller sphere of government
action.
By contrast, collective financing keeps resources under some type of government
control, with collectively defined goals achieved through the use of government-
monitored contractors or other private producers. Although collective financing of
private performance does not necessarily shrink the size of government, private
performers may (or may not) provide the goods or services more efficiently or
effectively than government employees. Collective and individual financing
accordingly accomplish privatization goals in very different ways, with dramatically
different consequences for both public administration and democratic decision
making.
My discussion proceeds as follows. The next Part begins with a brief overview of
the financing and performance dimensions of privatization decisions, followed by an
analysis of how taxation relates to both financing and performance. The level of
taxation is an important political choice, which the constitutional framework leaves
primarily to the political branches. The courts generally defer to congressional action
in this area. Nevertheless, in the process of developing this highly deferential
approach, courts have drawn distinctions between taxes and other means of paying
for or regulating the production of goods and services. These distinctions illustrate
and emphasize the important democratic values inherent in the taxing and spending
powers. These values are reflected in the decision-making procedures established by
the Constitution for collectively financed activities.
Part II, which draws from and builds on tax scholarship relating to "tax
expenditures," 28 sets forth the argument that general tax reduction and targeted tax
incentives, both ways of advancing privatization goals, differ in approaches to
financing. General tax reduction results in more individual financing of goods and
services. Targeted tax incentives, on the other hand, subsidize certain legislatively
favored activities and, therefore, comport with the pattern of privatization typically
followed in the United States of retaining collective financing but delegating
performance to the private sector. Across-the-board tax reduction and targeted tax
incentives advance different privatization goals with very different political
consequences.
The argument that targeted tax incentives are more like spending programs than
tax cuts is somewhat counterintuitive, and has been controversial in both academic
and political quarters.29 Regardless of whether that argument is accepted as a matter
27 Moore, supra note 4, at 1215 (observing that "we might see privatization most importantly
as the individualization of judgments about value that formerly were made collectively").
28 See discussion infra Part IH.B.
29 See discussion infra Part I.B.
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of theory, however, the characterization of tax provisions as revenue raisers or
revenue losers provides useful information to legislators because taxing and spending
decisions tend to be made incrementally and by reference to a current budgetary or
revenue baseline. The rest of Part III discusses some political and theoretical issues at
stake in defining the revenue baseline.
Part IV examines accountability issues. Administrative lawyers and scholars are
engaged in studying new ways in which regulation, contracts, and contract monitoring
may respond to the accountability problems created by increased "contracting out" or
privatizing of government services.30 A parallel effort to study ways in which
increased monitoring of tax incentives can be achieved needs to be undertaken. Tax
incentives generally do not involve negotiated relationships between government and
private contractors, but typically involve tax reporting to the Internal Revenue Service
and oversight jurisdiction by the tax-writing committees. The delivery of subsidies
through the tax system can mask governmental funding levels and allocations as well
as obscure accountability for outcomes being funded. The use of tax incentives as an
alternative to discretionary spending by government serves privatization goals thmugh
their use of market incentives and private choice. How to achieve greater political
accountability for both the financing and performance of tax incentives remains a
central challenge. Part IV ends with suggestions for ways to achieve such increased
monitoring.
The political debate about privatization focuses public attention on the roles
played by government and by private enterprise in achieving societal goals, but at the
same time may conceal more direct arguments about the proper goals for society.3 1
Discussion about government versus private performance, that is, about "ownership,"
"outsourcing," "management," and "competition" can mask important disagreements
about public values. These disagreements underlie the politics of taxation32 and under
our constitutional framework are resolved in large part by Congress through the
exercise of its taxing and spending powers.
II. DEFINING PUBLIC VALUES: CONGRESSIONAL TAXING AND SPENDING
POWERS
In interpreting express limitations on the taxing power, the U.S. Supreme Court
has distinguished between "taxes," or "revenue raising," and other methods of
financing or regulating activities.33 Those distinctions, developed in varied
30 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1285, 1289 (2003); Freeman, Private Role, supra note 7, at 549, 574-92.
31 Cass, supra note 6, at 452.
32 See MuRPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 8-10 (arguing that "jiustice or injustice in
taxation ... mean[s] justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result
from a particular tax regime").
33 See discussion infra Part f.B.
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constitutional contexts, capture certain important differences between collectively and
individually financed activities and embody the democratic values inherent in the
taxing and spending powers. Similar distinctions animate the financing and
performance dimensions of privatization decisions.
A. The Public/Private Dimensions of Financing and Performance
Privatization decisions contain dual dimensions of financing and performance.
They involve choices between individual versus collective financing (primarily
through taxation), and governmental versus private production of goods or delivery of
services. The financing dimension is independent of the performance dimension,34
creating four possible combinations of public/private choice: 1) collective financing
and governmental performance; 2) collective financing and private performance; 3)
individual financing and governmental performance; and 4) individual financing and
private performance.35
In the first pair of these combinations, collective financing and governmental
performance, the government raises revenues through taxes and produces the goods
or delivers the services through a government agency. Privatization proponents often
have this combination in mind when they urge reform. For example, tax dollars used
34 A similar distinction between financing and production was made by Richard Musgrave in
discussing the use of fiscal instruments to secure adjustments in the allocation of resources. See
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 3-27
(1959) (explaining the allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions of public budgets).
Musgrave distinguished between "provision for public wants" and "production." He explained
what he meant by the government "providing" for the satisfaction of public wants as follows:
We mean, simply, that the goods and services needed to satisfy public wants must be
paid for out of general revenue. The goods and services must be supplied free of direct charge
to the user, at the same time, they need not be produced under the direct management or
supervision of the government.
Id. at 15. He thus distinguished between goods "produced by the government and sold on the
market" and goods "produced privately but purchased by the government and distributed free of
direct charge." Id. In the first case, "there is no provision for public wants, while all production is
under public management," and in the second case, "there is no public production, but all resources
are devoted to provision for public wants." Id.
35 DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 7-8. As Donahue points out, the distinction between public and
private is "a good deal messier" than the categories suggest. Id. at 8. Comparisons must be
qualified by the variety of possible organizational forms, ambiguous distinctions between taxes and
prices, and political processes involved in choices about what to pay for collectively. Id. at 8-9.
For a similar explication of the financing and performance dimensions of public versus
private choice, see Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TooLs OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 27 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002). I disagree, however, with Salamon's categorization of special tax advantages
as an example of private finance and private delivery. See Id. at 28. For development of the view
that they combine collective financing with private delivery, see discussion infra Part M.B.
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by the government to provide public schools or social welfare services would fit this
pattern.
In the second pair, collective financing and private performance, the government
raises revenue, but then contracts with the private sector to deliver the goods or
services. Tax dollars used to pay private contractors to build roads, prisons, or supply
government offices with computers and paper fit within this pattern. So do school
voucher programs, in which tax dollars are used to finance the purchase by
individuals of educational services provided by private schools.
In the third pair, individual financing combined with governmental performance,
the government charges individuals a "user fee" for the goods or services provided.
Thus, the financing is private but the performance remains tied in some way to
government. The government may charge an individual or business a cost-based fee,
for example, for postal services, access to camp grounds at national parks, or use of
certain government-provided harbor services or maritime facilities.
Finally, the last pair, which combines individual financing with private sector
delivery, "covers the large share of the economy in which the government role is
limited to enforcing contracts and otherwise regulating, monitoring, and certifying
private exchange." 36 This pattern would include private market transactions, such as
the purchase of a haircut, a personal automobile, or a share of stock.
1. General Tax Reduction: Individual Financing of Private Performance
At the most fundamental level, privatization poses questions about the
appropriate level of taxation needed or desired to fund the public sector.37
Privatization proponents typically advocate tax reduction as a means to achieve a
reduction in the size of government, combining individual financing with private
production of goods and services.
For example, in the 1980s President Reagan created a commission to study the
appropriate division of responsibilities between the federal government and the
private sector. The Report of the President's Commission on Privatization described
privatization as "part of a fundamental political and economic rethinking" about the
role of government in the modem welfare state. 38 According to the Commission, tax
36 DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 7.
3 7 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETrz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PoucEs 1 (Rev. 4th ed. 2002) ("Taxation is the process by which a government
transfers resources (almost always money) from the private to the public sector."); see also, e.g.,
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 76 ("Taxation... determines how much of a society's
resources will come under the control of government, for expenditure in accordance with some
collective decision procedure, and how much will be left in the discretionary control of private
individuals, as their personal property."); MUSGRAVE, supra note 34, at 5-24 (describing the
objectives of budget policy as including allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions).
38 PRIVATIZATION, supra note 12, at xii.
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reform in the 1980s accomplished "major reductions and simplifications" in federal
taxation, which were intended to diminish "government influence over private sector
activity." 39
Twenty years later, the Bush Administration's initial approach to taxation echoed
the Reagan Administration's tax-rate-reduction approach.40 General tax reduction
serves privatization goals by decreasing government revenues and increasing the
amount of money in private hands, thereby reducing the role played by government.
George W. Bush made that link explicit when he campaigned in support of major tax
relief: "[T]he surplus is not the government's money-the surplus is the people's
money, and we ought to trust them with their own money." 41 After the 2000 election,
President Bush made a major tax cut a legislative priority, and accomplished it in
substantial part during the first six months of his administration.42
Although individual financing combined with private performance results in the
most complete form of privatization by shifting both the financing and performance
of a function to the private sector, it also raises serious concerns about distributive
fairness.43 Complete privatization would allow individual preferences to be asserted
through the marketplace, but only as permitted by the individual's income and wealth.
Redistributive policies can be implemented by providing the least well-off with
government-provided food, shelter, education, and health care, by providing them
with minimum levels of income 4 or wealth45 to make their own choices about what
39 Id. at 229. The Commission described the role of tax reduction as follows:
The United States has also been a leader in the effort to reduce the intrusiveness of
taxation in the private economy. By the 1980s tax rates in many nations had reached the point
of inhibiting private initiative, and taxes were exerting a pervasive influence on the behavior
of private corporations and individuals. The major reductions and simplifications in federal
taxation that occurred in the 1980s were intended to diminish this form of government
influence over private sector activity.
Id.
40 See, e.g., C. EUGENE SThEuRLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX PoLIcY 210 (2004).
41 Dana Milbank, Bush Signs Tax Bill Into Law: Lawmakers Spar Over Whether to Pare or
Extend $1.35 Trillion Cut, WASH. PosT, June 8, 200 1, at A l (describing the tax cut as fulfilling his
"signature campaign promise" and describing many of the President's words at the signing
ceremony as "the same he used on the campaign trail to sell his plan"); see also David Firestone &
Alison Mitchell, In Hot Debate, Bush and McCain Collide over Campaign's Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2000, at Al (quoting Candidate Bush as saying "either you trust the people or you trust
government" and describing his tax cut as giving people their money back).
42 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 200 1, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38.
43 See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 11, at 4 ("Ideology that places market concerns ahead of those
of equity and access animates the larger political discourse in which privatization is advocated.");
Paul Starr, The Case for Skepticism, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 25,27-29 (William
T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Starr, Case for Skepticism].
44 See MiLTON FkIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 161-76 (1963).
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they need or want, or through private charity. Arguably either governmental or private
performance can achieve the desired level of societal redistribution.
Accordingly, the reasons for or against government performance are not
necessarily reasons for or against redistribution.46 The reasons for or against
redistribution, however, often underlie arguments for or against collective financing.4 7
Decisions about taxation involve in part a collective determination about how much
inequality in the distribution of income and wealth will be tolerated. 4 8 Fairness in
collection of the tax relates to each individual's ability to pay a share of governmental
cost of publicly provided goods and services. The overall redistributive role of the
public budget49 is an important political choice, which our constitutional framework
leaves primarily to the political branches.50 The reasons for and against governmental
4 5 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALsToTr, TE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 4-5 (1999)
(presenting and defending a proposal of providing each citizen, upon reaching adulthood, a one-
time grant of $80,000 financed by an annual 2% wealth tax); ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN:
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY PROGRAM TO COMBATTHE NATION's NEW POVERTY 168-71,272 (1988)
(developing the idea, proposed in 1968 by Nobel Prize Winner Professor James Tobin, of an
"endowment" account or a "universal capital" account that would be assigned to all youths upon
graduation from high school, which could be used to support certain human capital investments of
their choice).
46 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 76-77 (arguing that reasons for and against putting
resources under government rather than private control are not necessarily reasons for or against
redistributing resources among groups or individuals and distinguishing between the "public-
private division" and "distribution").
47 See, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of
Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REv. 975, 983 (2000) (arguing that "what is frequently
portrayed as a numbers problem to which a 'correct' answer can be found is in fact an ideological
and political argument about wealth building versus direct income support and... of public
entitlement as opposed to private property rights"); Lisa Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen:
Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 113-18
(2000) (arguing that recent tax reforms in Canada signal a shift away from the redistributive ideals
of social citizenship toward a more individualistic model of market citizenship).
48 See generally Moore, supra note 4, at 1215-17 (describing Milton Friedman's proposal as
a particularly radical form of privatization, untainted by the problem of an 'unfair' distribution of
income" by in effect publicly financing a collectively determined minimum level of income and
wealth for everyone).
49 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 34, at 18 (suggesting that adjustments in the distribution of
income and wealth secured through the tax and transfer system, if implemented properly, tend to
involve the least interference in the efficient functioning of the economy).
50 Although the U.S. Constitution links the power to tax with the power to spend for the
"general welfare" the courts have largely deferred to the political process for determination of the
public purposes appropriate for congressional action. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
65-68 (1936) (observing that "Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the
general welfare," and adopting an expansive view of the scope of the spending power); South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,207 (1987) (citing Butler and noting that "[iln considering whether
a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer
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performance instead tend to center on efficiency and accountability concerns.
2. Tax Incentives and Private Performance
Privatization initiatives are part of a broader public law shift from centrally
managed government programs to decentralized and market-based models. 51 Under
these models, federally funded programs are managed by state or local government
officials, by quasi-governmental bodies, or are contracted out to private firms or
nonprofit organizations.52 The paradigm here would be competitive "contracting out"
by the government of collectively financed goods or services.
In the tax context, the term "privatization" can suggest an array of specific
management-related initiatives, such as "contracting out" tax-administration services
to private entities,53 or the use of tax-exempt nonprofit or "faith-based" organizations
to provide welfare-related services formerly provided by government personnel.54
substantially to the judgment of Congress"); see also discussion infra Part Il.B.
51 See, e.g., B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING: FOUR EMERGING MODELS 2, 21
(1996).
52 See, e.g., Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Powers to Private
Actors, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1687-824 (2002); Paul R. Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A
New Deal for the Nineties, 45 FIA. L. REv. 1, 5, 7-8, 11-12 (1993); see also A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. IL. L. REv. 543, 546 (1995);
Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Govenunent: The Promise of Institutional Choice and Government
Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 945,952-53 (1997).
53 Such proposed initiatives include pilot programs for private tax collection, outsourcing of
tax return processing, and using private contractors for electronic return filing. See, e.g., GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFHCE, TAX DEBTCOLLECiION: IRS Is ADDRESSING CRMCAL SUCCESS FACroRS FOR
CONTRACrNG OUT BUT WILL NEED To STUDY THE BEST USE OF RESOURCES 2-4 (2004), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4492.pdf (discussing FY2005 budget proposal to use private
collection agencies to help collect tax debts); George Guttman, News Analysis: How the IRS May
Test the Use of Private Collectors, 69 TAX NOTES 1435, 1435 (1995) (describing a $13 million
allocation in the 1996 IRS appropriation for a pilot program using private law firms and debt
collection agencies to collect outstanding tax debts); see also, e.g., George Guttman, News
Analysis: Where is IRS Modernization Heading?, 86 TAX NOTES 1191, 1193 (2000) (reporting that
much of the processing of returns that had planned to be outsourced by the IRS to the private sector
is instead being done by electronic return originators); James J. McGovern, The Tax Exempt and
Government Entities Division-The Pathfinder, 86 TAX NOTES 219, 229 (2000) (reporting on the
outsourcing of employee plans return processing). See generally Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Private
Tax Collectors: A Roman, Christian, and Jewish Perspective, 104 TAX NOTES 963, 968 (2004)
(concluding from historical experiments with private tax collection that the government should
provide adequate safeguards and ongoing supervision).
54 Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare
As We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493,528-42 (1999) (discussing the charitable choice provisions in
welfare reform legislation); see also Michele Estrin Gilnan, "Charitable Choice" and the
Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the NeedforRegulation with the FirstAmendment Religion
Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REv. 799, 801, 806-07 (2002); Steven K. Green, Book Review, The
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Privatization can also be fostered more generally, however, through other more
substantive tax provisions, including various types of tax incentives. Targeted tax
incentives encourage private businesses or individuals to engage in certain socially or
economically favored activities. 55 This type of "privatization" also involves a
redrawing of lines between the public and private sectors, making public goals private
interests by modifying market incentives. 56
Tax incentives operate by reducing the prices of favored goods or services,
relying on the market to determine how much production and consumption of the
desired output actually occurs. 57 Thus, they provide an alternative to public programs
managed by government bureaucrats by encouraging private individuals and
businesses to act in their own economic self-interest. Although they rely on market
responses, they alter existing market incentives through tax reduction for certain types
of activities. In the context of tax incentives, line-drawing issues between public and
private also relate to the distinction between taxes and prices, a distinction quite
ambiguous in practice.58
Ambiguity of Neutrality, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 692 (2001) (reviewing CHARLES GLENN, THE
AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FArm-BAsED ScHooLs AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (2000));
Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-
Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2000) (reporting that
"41 percent of charitable organizations providing human services receive government grants,"
citing a study published in 1993).
55 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 13, at 17. Butler argues that deregulation and tax incentives
achieve privatization goals for the following reasons:
The most general argument for deregulation applies in this instance-improving efficiency
and economic benefits through competition. The case for tax incentives as an added boost is
that by encouraging individuals to behave in a way that meets a particular public objective,
such as providing incentives for private medical coverage and private pension programs, these
services can be provided more efficiently than through publicly provided systems.
Id. at 20-21.
5 6 See, e.g., CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 5-6 (1977)
(arguing for "collective influence over individual and business behavior" by "modifying the
incentives of the private market" so that "public goals become private interests," rather than
"removing a set of decisions from the decentralized and incentive-oriented private market and
transferring them to the command-and-control techniques of government bureaucracy").
57 See Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending-Does It Make a Difference?, 53 NAT'L TAX J.
361, 362, 366-67 (2000). Their use expands the role of the tax system beyond its traditional
revenue-raising function. See discussion infra Part Ill.C.
58 DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 9. Donahue explains the distinction as follows:
If a payment is attached to something essential... then the payment may be called a fee or
price though it remains, in essence, a tax. Similarly, a tax that can easily be avoided by a
change in behavior-like building a home or factory on one side or the other of a
jurisdictional boundary-looks very much like a price.
Id. He then observes that "[t]rading on the ambiguous distinctions between prices and taxes can be
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After its first major tax rate cut, the Bush Administration, like administrations
before it, increasingly turned to the tax code as a means of implementing specific
domestic policy initiatives. 59 As observed by a commentator on proposals in
President Bush's fiscal year 2003 budget submission: "The limos from the Education
Department and Energy Department found their way to the Treasury building, and
their passengers-with the full backing of the White House-were insisting that
Treasury officials help them write 'tax laws.' 60 As in administrations past, the Bush
Administration used the tax code "to implement a broad range of policies that really
have nothing to do with collecting revenue."
6 1
Privatization proponents tend to favor tax incentives as a more effective
alternative to other types of government programs. They use the existing tax system to
stimulate private activity, a mechanism which permits the market to respond to
individual preferences. 62 Proponents tend to view the market as representing an
aggregation of individual preferences and thus an effective and cost-efficient way of
achieving goals. Under this view, public purposes would be well served by programs
politically expeditious" but that "it should not obscure the central issue: Should the item in
question be paid for individually or collectively?" Id.
A premise of Musgrave's allocation function of public budgets is that "satisfaction of social
wants must be related to individual evaluations of benefits received." See MUSGRAVE, supra note
34, at 20. Under the allocation function, taxes and expenditures serve as a tax-purchase mechanism
for providing public wants, as distinguished from the function of taxes and transfers in the
distribution branch. The distribution branch determines and secures the "proper" distribution of
income and wealth. The proper state of distribution is defined in terms of income earned minus
taxes or plus the transfers the distribution branch imposes. Taxes collected by the allocation branch
are disregarded by the distribution branch, and treated like personal expenditures made in relation
to the taxpayer's own evaluation of the social wants being satisfied. Id. at 20-21.
59 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOvERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PFRSPECTIVES: FIsCAL YEAR 2004, at 66 (2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET,
FY 2004] (proposing tax incentives for charitable giving, strengthening education, investing in
health care, protecting the environment, increasing energy production, and promoting energy
conservation).
60 Martin A. Sullivan, Tax Erpenditures for Republicans, 94 TAX NOTES 1571, 1571-72
(2002).
61 Id. at 1572.
62 However, tax incentives do not necessarily reduce overall public spending. See, e.g., Lester
M. Salamon, The Changing Tools of Government Action: An Overview, in BEYOND
PRIVATIZATION: THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 3, 4-11 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 1989)
[hereinafter Salamon, The Changing Tools]; Paul Starr, The Limits of Privatization, in PROSPECTS
FOR PRivATIZATION 124, 125 (Steve H. Hanke ed., 1987) [hereinafter Starr, The Limits of
Privatization] (explaining that many proposals for program termination contemplate the use of tax
incentives to stimulate private substitutes for public services and thus may not reduce public
spending); see also Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures as Tools of Government Action, in
BEYOND PRIVATIZATION: THE TooLs OF GOVERNMENT ACTION 167, 170-71, 184-90 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 1989).
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that permit the market to operate with as little government control as possible.
Critics of privatization point out that increased private choice results in less
participation in democratic political decision making6 3 and diminished political
transparency and accountability. 64 Politics offer a process for preference formation
through the protection of voting rights and procedures for political deliberation,
including open proceedings and constitutional protections for public discussion and
criticism. 65 Private firms have fewer obligations to provide access to information
about their operations or the reasons for their decisions.
The critics tend to view public values as representing something other than the
aggregation of individual preferences. They point out that the exercise of individual
choice in the marketplace is quite different from collective choice exercised through
political participation in the democratic process.66 The marketplace records individual
preferences through purchasing power.67 Its increased use for collectively financed
activities, critics argue, may result in a loss of political participation and deliberation
as well as the loss of those choices made possible through government action. 68
It thus matters politically whether targeted tax deductions or tax credits are
viewed as equivalent to collectively financed but privately provided goods or services
(that is, as subsidies), or instead as equivalent to general tax reduction, making more
individual resources available for private choice (that is, as tax cuts). 69 Before turning
to that discussion, however, first a consideration of the areas in which courts have
enforced limits on Congress's taxing and spending powers. The limitations, to the
extent they have been enforced by the courts, illustrate the democratic values inhering
in the taxing and spending powers, which are reflected in the decision-making
procedures established by the Constitution for collectively financed activities. In
defining such limitations, the courts have distinguished between individual financing
63 E.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOcRATIc EDUCATION 1-18 (1987) (discussing a democratic
theory of education). In discussing publicly financed voucher plans to increase parental choice of
schools, Gutmann argues that "[m]inimally constrained voucher plans... avoid the controversial
issue of how schools should educate citizens only at the cost of denying our collective interests in
democratic education" and that the "most defensible" "[m]aximally constrained voucher
plans... appear to avoid the issue only by shifting our controversies over democratic education
from a mixture of local, state, and national politics to a more purely centralized politics." Id. at 68-
69.
64 E.g., Starr, The Case for Skepticism, supra note 43, at 27-29; Starr, The Limits of
Privatization, supra note 62, at 131-36.
65 Starr, The Limits of Privatization, supra note 62, at 132.
66 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OFA PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 128-36, 141, 166-67 (1996).
6 7 See, e.g., MIlTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 14-18 (1980).
68 Starr, The Limits of Privatization, supra note 62, at 132.
69 See discussion infra Part III.
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of goods and services through "user" fees and collective financing through taxation.
B. Constitutional Limitations on the Taxing and Spending Powers
Although the Constitution links the taxing power with the power to spend for the
"general welfare," the courts have largely deferred to the political process for
determination of the public purposes appropriate for congressional action. In
interpreting express constitutional limits on the taxing power, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has analyzed the taxing power in relation to its financing function.
Differences between collective and individual financing underlie certain distinctions
important in constitutional analysis. The cases suggest that the express constitutional
limitations on the taxing power are enforced when Congress is engaged in general
"revenue raising" as opposed to collecting fees in exchange for goods or services.
That is, an imposition may be a "tax" when funds are collected from private parties
for a "public" purpose. In addition, the Court has drawn historically significant
distinctions between "taxes" and "penalties" for regulatory violations.
1. The Taxing Power
The U.S. Constitution vests in Congress the power to tax, placing certain express
limitations on its exercise.70 These limitations include the uniformity requirement
imposed on indirect taxes, 7 1 the prohibition against the taxation of exports, 72 and the
70 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERcAN CoNsnImnoNAL LAw 841-43
(3d ed. 2000); Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal
Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 3-12 (1987) [hereinafter Bittker, Constitutional Limits]. Bittker
quotes Chief Justice Chase's summary of the "very extensive" federal power to tax as follows:
It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress
cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect
taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may
be exercised at discretion.
Id at 4 (quoting The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462,471 (1866)).
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States").
The Supreme Court has interpreted the uniformity requirement to mean "geographic"
uniformity rather than uniformity as applied to individuals. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,106-
09 (1900) (holding the federal inheritance tax constitutional, even though it increased rates
progressively as the size of the legacy increased, because it taxed the subject of the tax at the same
rate throughout the United States). Even so, the Court has permitted Congress "to take into account
differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve
geographically isolated problems." The Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
159 (1974). See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983) (holding constitutional an
exemption of certain Alaskan oil from the Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 by concluding that
Congress had acted on the basis of "neutral factors" relating to the ecology, environment, and
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apportionment requirement imposed on direct taxes. 73 In addition, all bills for "raising
revenue" must originate in the House of Representatives. 74
The taxing power is also limited by the cross-cutting limitations of the Bill of
Rights,75 which can apply to any exercise of congressional power. Nevertheless, as
remoteness of the favored area).
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State."). See, e.g., United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 367-70 (1998)
(striking down an ad valorem harbor maintenance tax as applied to goods loaded at U.S. ports for
export as not reflecting a fair approximation of services, benefits, and facilities provided to
exporters, and thus, not a permissible user fee); United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S.
843,854-56 (1996) (holding that a tax on policies insuring exports is functionally the same as a tax
on exports); Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375-76 (1875) (upholding a tobacco stamp requirement
as a user fee rather than a prohibited export tax). For a recent discussion of these cases, see Erik M.
Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 16-42 (2003).
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census"); id. § 2, cl. 3 ("direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers").
In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895), the Court held that an
income tax is a direct tax (insofar as the source of income is property) and therefore invalid unless
apportioned. In so holding, the Court reversed course from an earlier determination that the income
tax adopted during the Civil War was an indirect excise tax. See Springer v. United States, 102
U.S. 586, 602 (1880); see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 171, 173-84 (1796)
(upholding federal tax on carriages as indirect tax not subject to apportionment requirement). The
distinction between direct and indirect taxes and the pre- and post-Civil War history leading to the
enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment is discussed in Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1999) and Calvin Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes:
The Foul-Up at the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3-5, 46-71, 73-82
(1999).
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provides that "Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend XVI.
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.").
See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-97 (1990) (rejecting the
government's argument that an Origination Clause challenge presented a nonjusticiable political
question). See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure,
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 361,422-27 (2004) (suggesting that the origination privilege may evolve as a
norm governing the behavior of bicameral legislatures "in which the lower house specializes in
information in return for the distributive advantage of having the first move").
75 With regard to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, for example, the
Court has recognized that a taxpayer may assert the privilege in a tax return, but the privilege does
not entitle a taxpayer to refuse to file any tax return at all. See generally United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259, 263--64 (1927) (upholding the conviction of a bootlegger for willfully failing to file
an income tax return, but suggesting that the taxpayer may claim the privilege with respect to
specific items). However, an otherwise valid tax may not impose a reporting or registration
requirement that would violate the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
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pointed out by Professor Boris Bittker, the Supreme Court has generally accorded
Congress a presumption of validity in the exercise of its taxing power:
[E]ven in the heyday of the judicial use of the due process clause to oversee
legislation regulating private business, the Supreme Court virtually deprived it of
any jurisdiction over the federal taxing power, stating in Brushaber v. Union Pacific
Railroad that "the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the
one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the
limitations of the due process clause." 76
Although the Court recognized a residual judicial function to intervene in
extreme cases if a"tax[] provision 'was so arbitrary... [as to constitute] confiscation
of property,"' a presumption of validity was accorded congressional action.77
Shortly after Brushaber, however, the Court decided a series of cases that
judicially distinguished valid revenue measures from invalid regulatory measures. In
the Child Labor Tax Case 78 and others decided during the first few decades of the last
century, 79 the Court held that a valid taxing provision "must be naturally and
reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of
some other purpose plainly within state power."80 A tax is a regulatory measure, and
thus invalid if not authorized by some independent source of congressional regulatory
power,8 1 if it is triggered by violation of a series of specified conditions enacted along
incrimination. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,60-61 (1968) (reversing a conviction
for violating a federal excise tax registration requirement imposed on those who engaged in the
business of accepting wagers, a criminal act in defendant's state, where the information was
required by statute to be shared with law enforcement officials).
76 Bittker, Constitutional Limits, supra note 70, at 11 (quoting Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R.,
240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916)).
77 Id. (quoting Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24).
78 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) [hereinafter Child Labor Tax Case].
79 E.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 (1922) (invalidating a tax imposed upon
noncompliance with federal regulation of grain boards of trade, which was imposed almost entirely
to compel compliance with regulations unrelated to the collection of the tax); see also Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 289 (1936) (invalidating a "tax" as a "penalty" and thus beyond the
taxing power and exceeding the commerce power); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287,
295-97 (1935) (holding a special federal excise tax on liquor dealers operating in violation of state
or local laws to be an invalid "penalty" because it exacted an exorbitant amount of money
compared to that assessed against law-abiding dealers, took effect only after a state or local law had
been violated, and usurped the states' police powers).
80 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 43 (citing United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86
(1919)).
81 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (upholding a federal tax on
banknotes issued by state banks since Congress had an independent source of power to regulate
currency under Article I, § 8).
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with the tax. 82 Although a tax could have an "incidental" regulatory effect, a tax is
unconstitutional "in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when
it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of
regulation and punishment."83
In the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court concluded that the excise tax imposed
upon an employer's noncompliance with federal regulations on the use of child labor
was invalid,84 since the Commerce Clause at that time was not thought to permit
federal regulation of child labor.85 When the Court later took a more expansive view
of congressional Commerce Clause powers,86 the doctrinal distinction between a tax
as a valid revenue measure and as an invalid regulatory device no longer served as a
meaningful limitation on federal regulatory authority.87
82 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 844.
83 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38.
84 The federal statute at issue provided as follows:
That every person (other than a bona fide boys' or girls' canning club recognized by the
Agricultural Department of a State and of the United States) operating (a) any mine or quarry
situated in the United States in which children under the age of sixteen years have been
employed or permitted to work during any portion of the taxable year, or (b) any mill,
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment situated in the United States in
which children under the age of fourteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or
children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen have been employed or permitted to work
more than eight hours in any day or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of seven
o'clock post meridian, or before the hour of six o'clock ante meridian, during any portion of
the taxable year, shall pay for each taxable year, in addition to all other taxes imposed by law,
an excise tax equivalent to 10 per centum of the entire net profits received or accrued for such
year from the sale or disposition of the product of such mine, quarry, mill, cannery, workshop,
factory, or manufacturing establishment.
Id. at 34-35.
85 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918).
86 Prior to 1937, the Court had upheld, under the Commerce Clause, congressional regulation
of interests affected with a public interest located in a current of interstate commerce, such as the
stockyard in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922). Similarly, the Court upheld regulation of
the grain board of trade, in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31-33 (1923), under a
revised law tailored to respond to the Court's objections to Congress's unsuccessful earlier attempt
to use its taxing power to regulate the same commodities exchange in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44
(1922). See, e.g., Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can it be "Revived"?, 51 DuKE
L.J. 1513, 1558-76 (2002) (discussing doctrinal developments in the Court's pre-New Deal era
and explaining the special difficulties posed for the Court by the Child Labor Tax Case).
87 The considerations employed by the Court in distinguishing between revenue measures and
prohibitory regulatory measures have been relied upon, in part, in federal or state tax cases dealing
with Fifth Amendment limitations. TRIBE, supra note 70, at 845 n. 16 (discussing double jeopardy
and self-incrimination cases). See Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,
779-83 (1994) (holding that a state tax on marijuana imposed on those who had been criminally
prosecuted for marijuana possession constituted a punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
[Vol. 65: 853
FINANCING OF PRIVATE CHOICE
After the New Deal Court's post-1937 expansion of national legislative powers,88
the Court never again invalidated a federal tax as an effort to impose regulatory
standards outside the scope of other enumerated powers.89 Because any such taxes
would have been upheld as a necessary and proper exercise of the Commerce Clause,
the relationship between the taxing power and other legislative powers received no
serious discussion or reconsideration by the Court in subsequent years.90
To summarize, the congressional taxing power is extensive, and the judiciary
largely accords Congress a presumption of validity in the exercise of the power. In
defining the limits of the power, the courts in the early part of the last century
distinguished revenue measures from regulatory taxes. Taxes were upheld as valid
revenue measures rather than prohibited regulatory taxes if they were unconditional
taxes, achieving their regulatory effects through their rate structure, 91 or if their
regulatory provisions bore a "reasonable relation" to their enforcement as a revenue
88 For a description of the fault lines in the Court's jurisprudence created by the virtual
demise of economic due process, see Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34, 36-45. McCloskey argued
that an explicit decision "to discard substantive due process root-and-branch would have
compelled the Justices... to examine the basis of their abnegation." Id. at 40. The preservation of
old rhetoric left "a large gap in the rationale that underlies the structure of modem constitutional
law." Id. In the end, he observed, "we are left with ajudicial policy which rejects supervision over
economic matters and asserts supervision over 'personal rights'; and with a rationale, so far as the
written opinions go, that might support withdrawal from both fields but does not adequatelyjustify
the discrimination between them." Id. at 45. As in the substantive due process area, the Court has
never fully repudiated the vocabulary it used to distinguish between "taxes" and regulatory
"penalties."
89 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 845. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14
(1937) (upholding a federal license tax on firearms dealers and observing that it is beyond the
competency of the courts to "[i]nquirte] into the hidden motives which may move Congress to
exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it .. "). See also, e.g., Mulford v. Smith, 307
U.S. 38,47-51 (1939) (upholding the imposition of penalties under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,393 (1940) ("The power of
taxation, granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of
another power which is granted it.").
90 The Court's recent more restrictive view of congressional Commerce Clause powers,
beginning with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), could revitalize the distinction
between valid revenue measures and prohibited regulatory taxes. See TRIBE, supra note 70, at 846
& n. 19, cf Post, supra note 86, at 1639 (placing pre-New Deal federalism in historical context and
observing that "[t]he Taft Court's suspicion of federal legislation was grounded simultaneously in
a commitment to economic rights deemed essential to 'the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men' and in a brooding mistrust of Congress's capacity authentically to register a national
democratic will, especially when compared to the Court's own legitimate role as a common law
conservator of public values").
91 See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 50-64 (1904) (upholding as a revenue measure
a tax of ten cents per pound on yellow oleomargarine even though the corresponding tax on white
oleomargarine was one fourth of a cent per pound).
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measure. 92 When this doctrinal distinction became less salient after the Court's view
of the commerce power expanded, the Court also generally tended to treat tax
provisions producing revenue as constituting a valid "revenue" measure.93
The courts have offered limited additional guidance with regard to the meaning
of the term "revenue" in other constitutional contexts, distinguishing between revenue
measures and special assessments or user fees. In interpreting the Origination Clause,
which requires that all bills for "raising revenue" originate in the House of
Representatives, 94 the Supreme Court has included revenues intended for the general
support of government but not special assessments designed to fund specific
programs from fines or fees.9 5 For purposes of interpreting the Export Clause, the
Supreme Court has similarly distinguished between prohibited taxes on exports and
permissible "user fees" tied to specific benefits, services, or facilities.96
92 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86,94-95 (1919) (upholding registration requirement
bearing some reasonable relation to its enforcement as a tax measure even if it may have been
motivated in part by its regulatory effects); see TRIBE, supra note 70, at 844.
93 TRIBE, supra note 70, at 846 n.19.
94 In this context, the term "raising revenue" has been interpreted by lower federal courts as
broadly encompassing provisions "relating to" revenue. Taxpayers challenged a large federal tax
increase enacted in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324. The legislation began as a House bill cutting taxes, but was replaced by a
Senate amendment increasing taxes. Taxpayers argued that TEFRA violated the Origination Clause
because the revenue-raising provisions originated in the Senate, not in the House. The federal
appellate courts rejected such challenges, generally holding that the term "raising revenue" refers to
all legislation relating to taxes regardless of its revenue effect, and that the bill passed by the House,
and later amended by the Senate and agreed to by the House, was a bill to "raise revenue" within
the meaning of the Origination Clause. Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.
1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Heitman v.
United States, 753 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); see also Texas Ass'n of Concerned
Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding the question to be
nonjusticiable), 476 U.S. 1151 (1986); Rowe v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Del.
1984), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984) (reaching the merits and rejecting the Origination
Clause challenge).
As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Armstrong, the revenue effect of legislation is difficult to
predict, and may depend on whether one looks to the long-term or short-run effects. 759 F.2d at
1381. See Bittker, Constitutional Limits, supra note 70, at 5-6. See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 388 (1990) (holding that a statute
that creates a particular governmental program to compensate crime victims and that raises revenue
through "special assessments" to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue
to support government generally, is not a "Bil[l] for raising Revenue" within the meaning of the
Origination Clause).
96 See supra note 72.
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2. Spending Power: The Scope of the General Welfare Clause
The spending power is textually linked with the taxing power in Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States. .. ."97 Thus, Article I couples the taxing
power with the power to spend for the "general welfare." 98 In interpreting the General
Welfare Clause, the Supreme Court historically has deferred to Congress.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Butler,99 decided in 1936, interpreted the
above-quoted language as empowering Congress to "lay taxes to provide for the
general welfare" and viewed the spending power as congruent with the power to tax:
The Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general
welfare. Funds in the Treasury as a result of taxation may be expended only through
appropriation. (Article I, § 9, cl. 7). They can never accomplish the objects for
which they were collected unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power
to tax. The necessary implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds
may be appropriated "to provide for the general welfare of the United States." 100
The Court in Butler then discussed the debate between Madison10' and
Hamilton 10 2 with regard to the scope of the spending power, and expressly adopted
Hamilton's more expansive views:
Madison asserted it amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers
enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section .... [I1n this view the
phrase is merely tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be necessary
incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative powers. Hamilton, on
the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate and distinct form
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
98 For discussion of the possible significance of the absence of the comma after the word
"Debts," see TRIBE, supra note 70, at 834, 834 n.2. See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLEs & PoLIcIEs § 3.4, at 268 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the broad
authority of Congress to tax and spend for the general welfare); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISEONCONSTrUTIONALLAW: SUBSTANCE&PROCEDURE§ 5.7, at 523 (3ded. 1999
& Supp. 2003) (stating that "[t]he constitutional power to spend is a condition imposed on the
power to tax" and "the power to spend is coupled with the power to tax and is cast in terms of the
power to tax 'and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare"').
99 297 U.S. 1,53-57,68-78 (1936) (holding unconstitutional on Tenth Amendment grounds
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which authorized a tax on agricultural goods in order to
fund emergency measures, such as paying some farmers to take their land out of production to
stabilize farm product prices).
100 Id. at 65.
10' See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
102 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 30, 34 (Alexander Hamilton).
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those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and
Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited
only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare
of the United States .... Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, espouses the
Hamiltonian position .... [We) conclude that the reading advocated by Mr. Justice
Story is the correct one. While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its
confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow
and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power of
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not
limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.103
The Butler Court thus rejected Madison's view that the federal spending power
was limited to subjects enumerated elsewhere in Article I, Section 8, and instead
adopted Hamilton's position that the spending power was a grant of independent
authority.
These general principles were reinforced the following year by the Court in two
key cases, which upheld the constitutionality of the federal unemployment
compensation system 1°4 and old age pension program created by the Social Security
Act.10 5 As Justice Cardozo stated in Helvering v. Davis, ' 0 6 in which the Court held
that the old age pension program did not violate the Tenth Amendment, the discretion
to decide whether the objective of a particular program advances the general welfare
rather than merely the interest of the directly benefited locality "belongs to Congress,
unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment." 107 The Court also emphasized that the concept was not "static": "Needs
that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the
well-being of the Nation." 10 8 The Court upheld the social security tax on employers,
the proceeds of which were intended to provide funds for payments to retired
103 Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66. In addition, the Court quoted Hamilton for the proposition that
"the purpose must be 'general, and not local."' Id. at 67.
104 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,589 (1937) (upholding a federal tax imposed
on employers to provide unemployment benefits and a credit allowed for similar taxes paid to a
state as a legitimate object of federal spending under the "general welfare" clause). Although
Congress conditioned the credits upon compliance with regulations, the tax and the credit in
combination were held to constitute inducement, not coercion, and as such did not violate the
Tenth Amendment. Id. at 585-86. The Court held that the credit for state taxes bore a reasonable
relationship "to the fiscal need" subserved by the tax in its normal operation, because state
unemployment benefits would relieve the burden for direct relief by the national treasury. Id. at
591.
105 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (noting also that "[t]he line must still be
drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and general").
106 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
107 Id. at 640.
10 8 Id. at 641.
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workers, in furtherance of the general welfare. 109
Fifty years later, in South Dakota v. Dole, 10 the Court reaffirmed the expansive
scope of the spending power. Objectives not thought to be within the enumerated
legislative powers "may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending
power and the conditional grant of federal funds." I Il In Dole, the Court upheld a
federal highway spending program that withheld five percent of otherwise available
federal funds from states that did not adopt a 21 -year-old minimum drinking age, and
adopted a multi-part test to determine whether federal spending conditions are
constitutional. 12
First, and most relevant to the discussion here, the Court noted that exercise of
the spending power must be in pursuit of the "general welfare," citing both Butler 13
and Helvering v. Davis.1 14 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
observed that "[i]n considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve
general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress."1 15 He also noted that the Court has "questioned whether 'general welfare'
is a judicially enforceable restriction at all."' 16 Next, any conditions Congress
imposes must be unambiguous so that each state can make an informed choice. 117
Third, there must be a "nexus" between the area being regulated and the substance of
the condition. That is, any conditions "might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs." ' 118 Finally, a
determination must be made as to whether any other constitutional provisions pose
109 Id.
110 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
111 Id. at 207.
112 Id. at 207-08, 212.
113 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)
114 301 U.S. at 640-41.
115 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
116 Id. at 207 n.2 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam)). In
Buckley, the Court upheld the public financing of election campaigns, stating as follows:
In this case, Congress was legislating for the "general welfare"--to reduce the deleterious
influence of large contributions on our political process, to facilitate communication by
candidates with the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of
fundraising.... Whether the chosen means appear "bad," "unwise," or "unworkable" to us is
irrelevant; Congress has concluded that the means are "necessary and proper" to promote the
general welfare, and we thus decline to find this legislation without the grant of power in
Article I, § 8.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
117 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
118 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,461 (1978)).
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"an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds."" 19
The Court concluded that the legislation was designed to serve the general
welfare as defined by Congress, that it met the clear statement requirement, the
condition imposed was directly related to the federal highway spending goal of
providing safe interstate travel, and that the Twenty-First Amendment did not bar
congressional involvement through the use of the spending power. 120 The Court thus
upheld the condition on the federal grant, even though it assumed that Congress could
not regulate drinking ages directly because of the explicit reservation of control over
alcoholic beverages to the states under the Twenty-First Amendment.
Despite the enforcement by the Rehnquist Court since Dole of federalism norms
in various forms, 121 the Court has not similarly qualified the scope of Congress's
broad conditional spending power. 122 Although the Court in Dole noted that
Congress cannot enact spending conditions to induce the states to engage in
unconstitutional acts 123 or to coerce states into actions rather than offering them a
choice, 124 no clear limiting principle on the spending power has emerged since
119 Id. at 208.
120 1d. at 210-12.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19, 627 (2000) (Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,925-
33 (1997) (Tenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54-73 (1996) (Eleventh
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-68 (1995) (Commerce Clause); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-66 (1992) (Tenth Amendment).
122 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992) (upholding conditional
spending provisions as a permissible means of encouraging state action with respect to nuclear
waste disposal).
123 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,210-11 (giving as examples grants "conditioned on
invidiously discriminatory state action or the inflicton of cruel and unusual punishment"). This
restriction is aimed primarily at protecting individual rights, such as rights under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments, from being violated and not states' rights. Compare United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203-04 (2003) (per Rehnquist, C.J.) (citing Dole and upholding the
Child Internet Protection Act, which requires libraries to use filter technology to block
pornographic images on their computers or lose federal funding, as a valid exercise of the spending
power) with Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547-49 (2001) (per Kennedy, J.)
(holding that congressional restrictions on the use of federal funds for welfare reform activities by
Legal Services Corporation grantees and their clients violates the First Amendment).
124 The Court acknowledged that financial inducements offered by Congress may be "so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' Dole, 483 U.S. at 211
(quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). However, no post-Dole
spending condition has been invalidated on that ground.
In the Eleventh Amendment context, Justice Scalia has drawn a distinction between Congress
threatening a "sanction" and a "denial of a gift or gratuity" if the state refuses to agree to its
condition. See Coll. Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 687 (1999) (per Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (acknowledging that such a distinction
could disappear where the gift withheld is substantial enough, but explaining that "where the
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Dole. 125
In sum, although the courts have enforced some limits on the taxing and spending
powers, they have largely left to the political process the determination of whether
federal legislation advances public purposes under the General Welfare Clause. In
defining revenue provisions, both Origination Clause and Export Clause cases draw
distinctions between individually financed "user fees" and collectively financed
"general revenues." On the spending side, Congress has a great deal of latitude in
determining whether a particular expenditure serves "public" purposes.
Constitutionally required enactment procedures 12 6 provide democratic legitimacy
for Congress's taxing and spending decisions.127 These decision-making procedures
apply to all legislation, whether Congress is raising or lowering taxes, enacting
targeted tax incentives, or appropriating funds. 128 Other democratic values, including
constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of
coercion is automatically passed--and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is
attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity"). Thus,
the Court found no voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity when a state merely engaged in
commercial activities regulated under a federal law, which provided that states are subject to suit in
federal court for false or misleading advertising in connection with those activities. Id.
(distinguishing such situations from the waiver of immunity that may be found in the state's
acceptance of a federal grant).
125 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 70, at 839 (observing that "the scope of the spending power
would seem to extend to virtually any secular activity"); Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's
Power under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731,
765 (2003) (explaining that the most direct approach to adopting a limiting principle "would
simply be for the Court to employ the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and rule that
Congress cannot use a carrot to accomplish what it is forbidden to do with a stick"). Professor
Choper criticizes the suggested distinction made by Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Dole,
between conditions that only generally relate to the purposes of Congress's grant and conditions
that expressly specify how the money should be spent, arguing that it is "just as malleable as other
potentially limiting principles." Id. at 766.
126 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (bicameralism and presentment); see, e.g., Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417,438-40 (1998); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919,951 (1983) (observing that the Article I power to enact statutes may only "be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure").
127 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,428 (1819) (observing that security against the
abuse of the taxing power is found in "the structure of government itself' and that in imposing a
tax, the legislature "acts upon its constituents," which provides in general "a sufficient security
against erroneous and oppressive taxation").
128 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."). See also
Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1937) (recognizing the wide
discretion of Congress in making general appropriations of amounts to be expended as directed by
designated government agencies). For a discussion of congressional budget authority outside of
annual "appropriations" acts, including contract authority, borrowing authority, and entitlement
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transparency and accountability, depend upon the availability of information about
and public understanding of those decisions. 129
1II. TRANSPARENCY: TAx AND BUDGET PoLmcs
Taxation generally determines the level of collective financing of goods and
services, whether produced and delivered by government employees or purchased
from the private sector. The use of tax incentives serves privatization goals by
providing more market-based private sector production alternatives. However,
targeted tax incentives result in revenue losses, which may be offset by higher tax
rates generally, higher governmental borrowing costs from increased deficit levels, or
by spending cuts.
The characterization of taxing and spending decisions influences public debate. It
matters politically whether tax incentives are viewed as equivalent to collectively
financed but privately provided goods or services; or instead, as equivalent to general
tax reduction. The recent re-examination of the tax expenditure budget by the Bush
Administration illustrates the political dynamics at play. 130
Although much of the tax code is designed to raise revenue or to accomplish
specific tax policy objectives, some tax provisions are identified as "tax expenditures"
by the Treasury13 1 and by Congress. 132 Under tax expenditure analysis, tax
authority, see Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Holings, 76 CAL. L. REv. 595,605-09 (1988) ("Entitlements, such as formula grant programs for
individuals and other entities, usually are permanently appropriated and may be funded either from
trust fund receipts... or general revenues.") (footnote omitted); see also Charles Tiefer,
"Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget
Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411,416 (1996).
129 E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 133 (1971) (stating that a condition for a
concept of right is publicity and explaining that "[tihe point of the publicity condition is to have the
parties evaluate conceptions of justice as publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral
constitutions of social life").
130 See discussion infra Part HLI.A.
131 Treasury published its first tax expenditure analysis in 1968, under the leadership of
Harvard Law School Professor Stanley S. Surrey, who served as Assistant Secretary of Treasury
for Tax Policy from 1961 to 1969. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OFTHE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE
30, 1968, Doc. No. 3245, 35-36, 322 ex. 29 (1969); see also Jonathan Barry Forman, Origins of
the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537, 537-38 (1986); Erwin N. Griswold, A True
Public Servant, 98 HARV. L. REv. 329 (1984) (describing Surrey's academic and public service
achievements). Currently, Treasury's tax expenditure budget appears in the ANALYTICAL
PERsPECTVES portion of the President's annual budget submission to Congress. See BUDGET, FY
2004, supra note 59, at 101.
132 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDruREs FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004-2008 (JCS-8-03) 1 & n.2 (2003) [hereinafter J. COMM.
TAX EXPENDn'URE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004-2008] (listing prior reports beginning in 1972, and
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expenditures are categorized as subsidies or as spending provisions (in the form of
foregone revenue), rather than as income measurement or revenue raising
provisions. 133 Tax expenditures may be in the form of exclusions, exemptions,
deductions, credits, deferrals, or special tax rates. Many targeted tax incentives
currently are identified in the budget process as "tax expenditures" and, thus, are
identified conceptually with the use of public resources. Tax expenditures are listed
for informational purposes as equivalent to governmental expenditures, listed by
reference to federal funding categories. 134
The following subsections describe the objections to the tax expenditure concept
raised in the Bush Administration's budget submissions, briefly explain the history of
the tax expenditure concept, and provide an analysis of the ownership and tax base
issues underlying the Administration's reconsideration of the tax expenditure budget.
A. Reconsideration in Progress
The Bush Administration's first budget, submitted to Congress in April 2001,
announced a controversial reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept. t35 The
budget submission questioned the value of tax expenditure analysis on both
ideological and technical grounds. 136 The ideologically based objection highlighted
containing current tax expenditure estimates prepared for the House Committee on Ways and
Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, and submitted also to the House and Senate
Committees on the Budget); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATON, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDrrRES FOR FiscAL YEARs 2002-2006 (JCA-1-02) 1 & n.2 (2002) [hereinafter J. COMM.
TAX EXPENDrrURE ESrMATES FOR FY 2002-2006].
133 See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1156
(discussing how tax expenditures function as government subsidies). For further discussion of the
tax expenditure concept, see discussion infra Part ll1.B.
134 Tax incentives are listed as "expenditures" in annual budget submissions to Congress. See
discussion infra Part Il.B.
13 5 See OFFICE OFMGMT. & BUDGEr, ExEcurivE OFFCE OFTHE PRESIDENT, BUDGErOFTHE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 61 (2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, FY
2002]. See Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 603, 603-04 (2003) (noting that by including the announcement "President Bush sparked a
minor firestorm within the Beltway" and that it sounded to many "like an opening salvo in a battle"
to eliminate the tax expenditure listings in the budget).
136 The Bush Administration's first budget submission explained the need for reconsideration
of the tax expenditure concept as follows:
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) requires that a list of "tax
expenditures" be included in the budget. So-called tax expenditures may be defined as
provisions of the Federal tax laws with exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits deferrals,
or special tax rates. Underlying the "tax expenditure" concept is the notion that the Federal
Govemrnment would otherwise collect additional revenues but for these provisions. It assumes
an arbitrary tax base is available to the Government in its entirety as a resource to be spent.
2004]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
key assumptions underlying the tax expenditure concept: that the government would
"otherwise collect additional revenues but for these provisions" and that these
revenues constitute a "resource to be spent."1 37 Technical objections questioned the
income tax baseline used to determine the tax expenditure list. The Bush budget
criticized the current income tax baseline for its arbitrariness and its "breadth." 138
Although it was impossible to tell from its first budget submission whether the Bush
Administration's reconsideration would lead to the rejection of the tax expenditure
concept or to other less drastic changes in budget presentations made in the future,
some initial observations by Treasury officials suggested that the changes being
considered related to the tax baseline used in tax expenditure analysis. 139
The Bush Administration's second budget, submitted to Congress in 2002,
confirmed those initial indications and provided a more complete description of the
ongoing reconsideration of the tax expenditure presentation in the budget.140
According to the Administration's second budget submission, the re-evaluation and
revision efforts by Treasury would focus on three main tax baseline-related issues: 1)
a redefinition of the baseline income concept "to be more consistent with a
comprehensive income tax base"; 2) consideration of issues involved in estimating
"negative" tax expenditures in addition to the current list of positive tax expenditures;
and 3) consideration of "estimating tax expenditures relative to a hypothetical
consumption tax, as well as to an income tax."'14 1 The study would consider "possible
Because of the breadth of this arbitrary tax base, the Administration believes that the concept
of "tax expenditure" is of questionable analytic value. The discussion below is based on
materials and formats developed and included in previous budgets. The Administration
intends to reconsider this presentation in the future.
BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 61.
137Id.
13 8 Id.
139 Id. at 76 (noting that "[a] tax expenditure is an exception to the baseline provisions of the
tax structure" and that "[t]he 1974 Congressional Budget Act did not specify the baseline
provisions of the tax law"); see Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax
Expenditures List, 91 TAX NoTEs 535, 535 (2001) (reporting that the Treasury Department is
conducting a periodic review into what should be considered a "normal tax system," and quoting
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Mark A. Weinberger, as observing that our tax system
is "really a hybrid tax, a mixture of income and consumption based systems" and "we're going to
look at whether the definition has to be modernized as to what is a normal system and what is a
deviation from it").
14 0 See OFFICE OFMGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT, BuDGE7OFTHE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTvES: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 95-97 (2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET,
FY 2003].
141 Id. at 96-97. The concept of "negative tax expenditures" is related to the notion of a tax
penalty. For example, a statutory limitation on the deduction of economic losses or other business
costs would be inconsistent with an income tax, and thus could be classified as "negative" tax
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revisions -and improvements in methodology and approach."' 14 2 In addition, the
second budget submission stepped back somewhat from the first budget's criticism by
acknowledging that "[tihough imperfect, the tax expenditure budget has expanded
our understanding of policy programs operating through the Federal income tax and,
more generally, the workings of the Federal income tax."' 143
The Administration's next two budgets, submitted in 2003 and 2004, contained
the initial results of Treasury's ongoing study of each of the above-mentioned
baseline issues, as well as revised estimates of selected tax expenditures. 144 The
Treasury review summarized differences between "official" tax expenditures and
those based on a comprehensive income tax, 145 included a discussion of negative tax
expenditures, 146 and provided an analysis of categories of tax expenditures under a
theoretical consumption-based tax. 147 In addition, it explained its new methodology
for revised estimates of selected tax expenditures, including lowered estimates for
accelerated depreciation. 
148
expenditure. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 67 (2004) (providing a 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized
deductions).
142 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 96.
143 Id. at 95. The budget submission explains the statutory requirement that the annual federal
budget presentation include a list of "tax expenditures" as follows:
Policymakers and researchers have long recognized that certain income tax code
provisions have policy purposes other than simply raising revenue and that it is useful to
understand better the nature of these provisions. It is important to know the amounts of
revenue associated with them, whether they are achieving desired results, and their
consequences for the economy. The answers to these questions are important simply as a
source of information, but also so that policymakers and the public can review these features
of the income tax regularly to see if change is warranted.
Id. at95.
144 BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 130-40. The study is reproduced in updated form in
the budget submitted to Congress in February 2004. OFFICE OF MGmT. & BUDGEt, ExEcurvE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT, ANALYrICAL
PERSPECTIVES: EIscAL YEAR 2005, at 314-25 (2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf [hereinafter BuDGET, FY 2005].
145 The review concludes that "[m]ost large tax expenditures would continue to be tax
expenditures were the baseline taken to be comprehensive income, although some would not."
BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 130.
146 The FY 2004 budget documents define negative tax expenditures as "provisions that
cause taxpayers to pay too much tax." Id. at 133 (providing examples, including the corporate
income tax and passive loss rule restrictions on deductions of capital losses).
147 Id. at 134-37.
148 The new methodology for estimating the tax expenditure from accelerated depreciation
uses replacement cost rather than historic cost and approximates "the degree of acceleration
provided by current law over a baseline determined by real, inflation adjusted, economic
depreciation." Id. at 138. Under the new methodology, the new estimates "are smaller" than the old
baseline depreciation estimates. Id. In addition, the review provides an alternative estimate of the
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The last major tax baseline change to the tax expenditure budget was proposed
by Treasury early in the Reagan Administration, 149 and was later adopted by that
Administration in a somewhat diluted, form 150 The Bush Administration
reconsideration echoed some of the concerns expressed about the tax baseline that
prompted the modifications adopted over two decades ago. 151 Before turning to a
more complete discussion of the implications of the Bush Administration's
reconsideration, the next section describes the development of tax expenditure theory
and its impact on congressional tax and budgetary decision making. Those familiar
with this history might wish to proceed to the following section.
B. The Tax Expenditure Concept: Some Background
As explained by the leading tax expenditure theorists, tax expenditures involve
"the imputed tax payment that would have been made in the absence of the special
tax provision (all else remaining the same) and the simultaneous expenditure of that
payment as a direct grant to the person [or business] benefited by the special
provision."' 152 Tax expenditure theory divides the tax code into two elements: (1)
tax expenditure resulting from the tax exemption of the return earned on owner-occupied housing.
149 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
150 See Martin A. Sullivan, Administration Reignites Old Battle Over Tax Expenditures, 91
TAX NoTEs 701, 702 (2001) (describing the attempt by Treasury Under Secretary for Tax and
Economic Affairs Norman B. Ture to "completely overhaul" the tax expenditure budget early in
the Reagan administration and explaining the resistance to Ture's proposals by the Office of
Management and Budget). According to Sullivan, "OMB officials thought it might be politically
insensitive for Treasury to be suggesting corporations were overtaxed when generous depreciation
allowances and controversial leasing provisions were rapidly shrinking the corporate tax burden"
and "OMB recognized that any critique of the tax expenditures budget could backfire on the
administration if-as came to pass later in 1982-it sought reductions in tax expenditures to
reduce the deficit." Id.
151 The Bush Administration's reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept revisits some
of the core objections to the tax expenditure budget raised in 1981 by Norman Ture,
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Tax and Economic Affairs. Ture's objections led to the
adoption of a modified reference tax baseline by the Reagan administration. His views were not
adopted in full, however. The Office of Management and Budget refused to clear his proposed
testimony on tax expenditures before the Senate Budget Committee in November 1981, and his
appearance before the committee was cancelled. However, a copy of his undelivered testimony
later appeared in print. See Ture's Unreleased Testimony on Tax Expenditures, 13 TAX NOTES
1535, 1535-39 (Dec. 21, 1981) (arguing for use of a "neutrality" standard, leading to a
consumption tax base); see also Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?,
92 TAX NOTES 413, 419-21 (July 16, 2001) (arguing in favor of the Bush Administration's
reconsideration and suggesting that it may be laying the intellectual groundwork for a tax reform
proposal that would shift the tax code toward a consumption base).
15 2 STANLEY S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REtoRM: TuE CONCEPTOFTAX ExPENDmiREs
6-7 (1973).
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provisions needed to implement the "normal tax structure," and (2) "special
preferences."15 3
A central insight of the tax expenditure concept is that financial assistance can be
delivered to a particular industry, activity, or class of persons through the tax system.
The financial assistance may take the form of permanent exclusions from income,
deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special tax rates. 154 Tax
expenditures are viewed as functionally equivalent to spending programs because
they reduce the revenue that would otherwise be collected absent the tax expenditure
provision. Beneficiaries of a tax preference are viewed as having received a
government grant or appropriation equal to the amount of the tax reduction due to the
preference.155 Thus, in addition to its revenue-raising function, the tax system can be
used as a delivery mechanism for government programs. The funding for the
programs comes in the form of refunds from, or reductions in, tax otherwise due,
rather than from congressional appropriations.15 6
Once a provision is identified as a "tax expenditure," tax expenditure theorists
urge policymakers to consider whether financial assistance is warranted and, if so, to
determine whether a direct government grant or a tax expenditure would provide a
153 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANML, TAX EXPENDFURES 3 (1985) [hereinafter
SURREY & MCDANmL, TAX ExPENDrnJEs]. Professors Surrey and McDaniels have explained the
tax expenditure concept as follows:
The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of two distinct
elements. The first element consists of structural provisions necessary to implement a normal
income tax, such as the definition of net income, the specification of accounting rules, the
determination of the entities subject to tax, the determination of the rate schedule and
exemption levels, and the application of the tax to international transactions. These provisions
compose the revenue-raising aspects of the tax. The second element consists of the special
preferences found in every income tax. These provisions, often called tax incentives or tax
subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a particular
industry, activity, or class of persons.... [These departures from the normative tax structure
represent government spending for favored activities or groups, effected through the tax
system ....
Id.
154 Id.
155 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 706 (1970).
156Toder, supra note 57, at 363. Although conceptually similar to "spending," tax
expenditures do not generally involve a direct outlay of funds, with the exception of certain
refundable tax credits such as the earned income tax credit. The foregone revenue from "tax
expenditures" need not be "appropriated" by Congress. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the
Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1359 (1988) ("While as a matter of policy Congress may want to treat
tax expenditures as equivalent to government spending, the Constitution does not require any such
treatment.") (footnote omitted).
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better framework in which to provide government assistance. 157 Fewer tax
expenditures in the tax code, some theorists argue, would lead to a more equitable,
more efficient, and more administrable tax system and, thus, to better tax policy.158
The tax reform project of tax expenditure theorists, therefore, initially combined the
related goals of achieving a more comprehensive income-measuring tax base with the
elimination, whenever feasible, of tax expenditures from the tax code. 159
Tax scholars have extensively debated issues related to defining and measuring
"tax expenditures."' 160 Much of the controversy about tax expenditure analysis has
focused on the difficulty of distinguishing "tax preferences" from "normal" or
structural tax provisions deemed necessary to define the income tax base. 161 There is
15 7 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDrriREs, supra note 153, at 99-117. Tax
expenditures are sometimes viewed as less bureaucratic or more cost effective than developing a
new spending program. Often, however, tax expenditures are enacted to supplement existing
discretionary spending programs, and as pointed out by tax expenditure theorists, tax expenditures
increase the enforcement and administrative burdens of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service.
158 Id. at 25-27. The tax reform strategy of eliminating tax expenditures from the tax code
may not work well in today's world, as Gene Steuerle has argued:
We have moved to a world where it is increasingly harder to separate tax and spending
issues .... Those concerned with coming up with a cleaner, more efficient, and more
administrable tax system, therefore, may need to change strategy. The purist cannot claim to
be pure by keeping outlay types of issues off of the table. A long-term strategy-admittedly
difficult---might be to figure out some way Congress more easily could consider outlay and
tax issues simultaneously when a major tax (or outlay) bill is being considered.
Gene Steuerle, The Merger of Tax & Expenditure Policy in the 2001 Tax Legislation, 92 TAX
NoTEs 291,292 (2001).
159 Comprehensive tax base proposals and the tax expenditure concept do not completely
overlap, having some different antecedents and proponents, but they are related to the extent that
they both seek to broaden the income tax base. Cf Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax
Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 251 (1969).
160 For an early discussion of these issues, see id.; Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure
Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538 (1969); Stanley S.
Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22
NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969).
161 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 309, 313 (1972) (examining whether certain personal deductions can be seen as a refinement
of ideal income); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARv. L. REv. 925,934 (1967) [hereinafter Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base] (criticizing the
internal inconsistencies and individual judgments made by Surrey's income tax baseline); Thomas
D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deduction in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 344-45
(1989) (evaluating the different models of personal deductions applied by Surrey, Andrews, and
Kelman); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831, 835
(1979) (criticizing Andrews' analysis and proposing an alternative net income tax base).
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no precise definition of the income tax baseline or the exceptions to it. As Professor
Boris Bittker explained, in responding to the suggestion that we should lean over
backward to avoid tax preferences, "in the absence of a generally acceptable or
scientifically determinable vertical, we cannot know whether we are leaning
backward or forward."' 162
Some scholars have suggested ways of addressing the definitional issues, ranging
from narrowly confining the tax expenditure list to those universally recognized as
spending programs, to broadly including all arguable tax expenditures, or to a more
middle ground position of redefining tax expenditures as "substitutable" tax
provisions--that is, to those provisions that could be easily substituted by direct
expenditure programs because they do not serve significant tax-related functions. 163
The tax expenditure concept has also generated political controversy. Some
business representatives immediately rejected the asserted equivalence between tax
preferences and direct government outlays, arguing that tax expenditure analysis
"rests on the presumption that government has a preeminent claim on income and
resources" and that tax incentives instead properly acknowledge the productive
owner's "prior, even natural, ownership claim to that income."' 64 Some members of
Congress similarly have been skeptical of treating tax expenditures as equivalent to
spending programs. Elimination of tax expenditures is perceived by them to be a tax
increase, thus politically difficult unless combined with a highly visible rate reduction
or some other popular offset. 16 5
Despite the theoretical and political difficulties with defining tax expenditures,
Congress has required the listing of tax expenditures as part of the budget process
since 1974.166 The tax expenditure budget is used primarily for information purposes,
162 Bittker, Comprehensive Tax Base, supra note 161, at 985.
163 Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 79, 82-83, 88-89 (1980) (proposing a methodology for identifying tax expenditures
that would bypass problems of defining the normal tax structure); Thuronyi, supra note 133, at
1163-70, 1181-82, 1186-87 (summarizing the definitional issues and arguing that substitutable
tax provisions can be classified by identifying the significant purposes of the provision and then by
determining whether a non-tax program could serve those purposes equally well).
164 Carl H. Madden & James R. Morris, Tax Incentives: Employment and Training of the
Disadvantaged, in TAX INcENnvEs, SYMPOsIUM CONDUCTED BY ThETAX INSMU0IE OFAMERICA,
Nov. 20-21, 1969, at 231,234-45 (by economic analysts employed by the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States).
165 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. RaV. 501 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Offset Requirements];
Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995).
166 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§ 3(3), 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.) (defining
"tax expenditures" as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow
a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability").
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to help policymakers determine the "relative merits of achieving specified public
goals through tax benefits or direct outlays."1 67 Both Congress and Treasury prepare
lists of tax expenditures organized according to budget functions. 168 However,
currently, they each use slightly different tax baselines in defining tax expenditures.
During the Reagan Administration, 69 the Treasury developed a baseline
different from the standard used by the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation.
Under the Joint Committee's approach, tax expenditures have generally been defined
by reference to a modified normative tax base. The normative model is based on the
Haig-Simons economic definition of income,170 modified in several important
respects. 171 Due to practical administrative concerns, the model excludes unrealized
167 j. COMM. TAX EXPENDTURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004-2008, supra note 132, at 2.
168 Tax expenditures are listed according to their budget function, in budget categories such
as national defense, agriculture, housing and commerce, education, and income security. The tax
credit for production of non-conventional or alternative fuels, for example, is found under the
budget category for "energy." BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 63 tbl.5-1; J. COMM. TAX
EXPENDrRE ESIMATES FOR FY 2004-2008, supra note 132, at 20-21 tbl. 1.
169 The Bush Administration's fiscal 2002 budget revisited themes introduced twenty years
earlier in the Reagan Administration's tax expenditure budget presentation. See OFFiCE OFMGMT.
& BUDGET, EXECUtmvE OFFicE OF m PRESIDENT, BUDGET OFThE UNrED STATES GOVERNMENr.
FISCAL YEAR 1983: SPECIAL ANALYsIS G, at 1 (1982) [hereinafter BUDGET, FY 1983: SPECIAL
ANALYSIS G] ("The very term 'tax expenditure' is misleading in several respects, and there are
formidable difficulties in trying to define the underlying concept or to measure the effect of
special' tax provisions.").
The Reagan Administration's tax expenditure budget was criticized as departing from the tax
expenditure concept and from standards established by the Budget Act of 1974. See Paul R.
McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Expenditures: How to Identify Them; How to Control Them,
15 TAX NOTEs 595, 595-601 (1982) [hereinafter McDaniel & Surrey, Tax Ependituresj; see also
Sullivan, supra note 150, at 702.
170 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINmIION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FiSCAL POLCY 50 (1938) ("Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question."); Robert Murray Haig,
The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1,7 (Robert
Murray Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS'N, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 59 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959) ("Income is the money value of
the net accretion to one's economic power between two points of time.").
171 Past reports prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee have discussed the normative
model. By contrast, more recent reports simply state that "[t]he determination of whether a
provision is a tax expenditure is made on the basis of a broad concept of income that is larger in
scope than 'income' as defined under general U.S. income tax principles." J. COMM. TAX
EXPENDrInRE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004-2008, supra note 132, at 2; accord J. COMM. TAX
EXPENDrIURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002-2006, supra note 132, at 2. For this reason, the report
notes, the tax expenditure list includes estimates for "the net exclusion of pension contributions
and eamings, the exclusion of extraterritorial income, as well as other exclusions, notwithstanding
that such exclusions define income under the general nile of U.S. income taxation." Id. at n.6.
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gains and losses, imputed income from services provided by owner-occupied homes
and durable goods, and inflation adjustments.172 In addition, it generally assumes the
classical system of taxing most corporations on their income separately from the
taxation of shareholders. 173
Under the "reference tax" baseline adopted by Treasury during the Reagan
Administration, a provision is treated as a tax expenditure only if it constitutes an
exception from some general rule stated in the law. 174 For example, the Treasury
omitted accelerated depreciation from the tax expenditure list because accelerated
depreciation had been the general rule since 1981, not the exception.175 Treasury's
reference tax baseline was criticized as overly politicizing the tax expenditure
budget176 and defended as avoiding many of the judgments made under the
normative approach.' 77 However, the two different approaches do not currently result
in major differences in the tax expenditures listed; with some exceptions, the Treasury
and Joint Committee lists have been roughly similar since 1986.'78
As a tax reform effort, tax expenditure analysis has had mixed results. Some
reforms suggested by tax expenditure theorists have been adopted, including the
listing of tax expenditures in the budget since 1974,179 the movement toward a more
comprehensive tax base with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,'80 and
17 2 J. COMM. TAX EXPENDrrURE EIMATS FOR FY 2004-2008, supra note 132, at 5.
17 3 Id. at7.
174 See BUDGET, FY 1983: SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 169, at 5 (stating that "[flor a
provision to involve a tax subsidy, two conditions are necessary:-The provision must be 'special'
in that it applies to a narrow class of transactions or taxpayers; and--There must be a 'general'
provision to which the 'special' provision is a clear exception").
175 See id. at 6-7. In addition, the "reference" tax baseline differs in its treatment of the
corporate tax graduated rate structure (the lower rates are not treated as tax expenditures), the
exclusion from income of government transfer payments (not treated as tax expenditures), and the
deferral of tax on income from controlled foreign corporations (not treated as a tax expenditure).
176 SURREY & MCDANiL, TAX EXPENDnUREs, supra note 153, at 595; Linda Sugin, Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HAsTINGs L.J. 407, 424-27 (1999).
177 Thuronyi, supra note 133, at 1182-86.
178 For the Joint Committee's comparisons with Treasury's list of tax expenditures, see J.
COMM. TAX EXPENDrIURE ESTIMATES FOR FY 2004-2008, supra note 132, at 1, 13-16 (noting, for
example, that Treasury's list contains a section that lists estate and gift tax provisions considered to
be tax expenditures but that the Joint Committee includes only provisions outside of the normal
income tax structure).
179 See supra notes 136 and 166 and accompanying text.
580 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
beginning at 26 U.S.C. § 1); see 1 OFFiCE OFTHE SEC'Y, DEP'T OFTHE TREASURY, TAX REFORM
FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICrrY, AND ECONOMIC GROwm: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENTREPORTTOTHE
PRESIDENT vii (1984) (discussing proposal to reform the income tax system); see also TIMOTHY J.
CONLAN Er At, TAXING CHOIcES: THE POLrrcs OF TAX REFORM 45-80, 242-44 (1990)
(describing the role played by tax policy experts in developing the concept of comprehensive tax
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the adoption in 1990 of certain budgetary restrictions on new tax preferences.181
However, much of the tax expenditure reform agenda was never implemented.
Relatively few tax expenditures identified since 1974 have been eliminated from the
tax code. Since 1986, tax expenditures have grown again in both in number and in
their overall budgetary impact. 182 During the 1990s, the trend was toward substitution
of discretionary spending with tax expenditures. 183 During that period, tax scholars
reform); John F. Witte, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A New Era in Tax Politics?, 19 AM. POL. Q.
438, 443 (1991) (stating that "[s]eventy-two provisions tightened tax expenditures, including 14
that involved complete repeal, a figure approximately equal to the total number of tax expenditures
that had been repealed from 1913 through 1985"). But cf Thuronyi, supra note 133, at 1176-77
(finding only one instance in which the 1986 Act substituted a direct expenditure for a repealed
provision, i.e., the amendment of the Social Security Act to provide federal spending support for
expenses of adopting children with special needs in place of an itemized tax deduction for such
expenses).
181 In 1990, federal budget legislation required that certain new tax benefits be offset by tax
increases, cuts in other tax expenditures, or cuts in entitlement programs. See Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990, Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (establishing "pay-as-you-
go" [hereinafter PAYGO] budget requirement that tax changes resulting in revenue loss be paid for
by tax increases, by reductions in current tax subsidies, or by certain direct spending reductions in
entitlement programs). Although nominally in effect through 2002, the rules had little impact since
the late 1990s. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 10201-205, 111 Stat.
251,697-702 (extending discretionary spending limits and PAYGO requirements until October 1,
2002, and to 2003 for expenditures for highways and mass transit). In later years, Congress
bypassed or waived the requirements. See, e.g., BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243 (stating
that "Congress and the previous Administration began to skirt the budget enforcement
mechanisms" after the reporting of budget surpluses in 1998); Warren Rojas, Budget Heads Say
PAYGO, Spending Caps Need Updating, 2001 TAX NOTESTODAY, LEXIS 2001 TNT 125-2, June
27, 2001 (reporting that Dan L. Crippen, director of the Congressional Budget Office, told House
Budget Committee members that the $1.35 trillion tax cut enacted in 2001 had already been added
to the PAYGO scorecard and would likely be waived because of the surplus). See discussion infra
Part IV.A.
182 U.S. GEN. Accr. OFmcE, No. 122, TAX Poucy: TAX EXPENDrrJREs DEsERVE MORE
ScRutINY 17 fig.l.l, 35-37 (1994) (finding an upward trend in the total number of tax
expenditures and in Joint Committee on Taxation estimates of aggregate tax expenditure revenue
losses from 1974 to 1986, a downward trend in revenue losses after implementation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, followed by another trend upward in the 1990s approaching the high point of
revenue losses in the 1980s); accord STEUERLE, supra note 40, at 43 fig.3.2, Trends in Tax
Expenditures, 1980-2003 (showing tax expenditures peaking at about 8% of GDP in 1985,
dropping to 5.6% in 1990, and increasing to about 6.5% of GDP in 2003).
183 See, e.g., Toder, supra note 57, at 361-62; Sugin, supra note 176, at 408 (noting that the
federal government spent more money through the Code in 1998 than through the discretionary
appropriations process and that the "tax law's traditional revenue-raising function is being eclipsed
as it becomes a principal tool of federal policy"); see also Leonard E. Burman, Surplus Tax
Policy?, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 405,409 (1999) (explaining that "budget rules create a strong incentive
to channel new spending through the tax side of the budget"). See generally CHRISTOPHER
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also began shifting their focus from the theory's definitional problems to its insight
that the tax system could function as a delivery mechanism for financial assistance,
utilizing that institutional insight to analyze the tax system within the overall
governmental tax and transfer system.' 84
C. Public Resources v. Private Ownership
The idea that tax incentives "subsidize" private behavior with public resources
provokes strong objections in some quarters. According to those who reject the
concept of tax expenditures, a tax incentive cannot be viewed as a "subsidy" because
the money that would have gone to the government in the form of taxes belongs to the
taxpayer in the first instance. 185 Under this view, a tax incentive or tax preference is
equivalent to a tax cut. Even if it is not an across-the-board rate decrease but is instead
a tax break targeted to benefit certain individual taxpayers or industries, such a tax
break returns money to the people's pockets or to the industries' bottom line.
This viewpoint also presumes that tax incentives are largely self-administered by
taxpayers and, thus, permit less government involvement. The asserted equivalence
between tax preferences and tax cuts makes the use of tax incentives conceptually
HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDrrURES AND SocIAL PoucY IN THE UNITED
STATES 190 (1997) (observing that, since the links between tax expenditures and direct
expenditures were recognized by policymakers in the 1970s, the "most common response" by
moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats "has been to use tax expenditures as a means
of slowing the growth or preventing the creation of traditional social programs").
184 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955,977 (2004) (observing that "[o]nce definitions are put aside, the tax
expenditures question really is the integration question" and considering integration from an
organizational institutional design framework of specialization and coordination, using the earned
income tax credit and food stamp programs as examples); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income
Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533, 564-70
(1995) (examining the institutional advantages and disadvantages of tax and transfer integration,
using the earned income tax credit as an example of tax-based welfare reform); see also, e.g., Mary
L. Heen, Welfare Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child
Care Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 173, 210-16 (1995)
(considering taxing and spending programs related to work-related child care benefits for low-
income families).
185 See The $91 Billion Loophole, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1975, at 22 (objecting to the tax
expenditure concept):
As we all should know by now, or at least should learn by 1984, nothing any of us earn
really belongs to us. Everything belongs to the federal government ... The idea, we suppose,
is that maybe the government would do a better job of keeping this money and spending it
directly. To look at it this way, maybe we'd be better off if the government kept all of what
really belongs to it, $1.3 trillion of personal income, and made all our purchases for us. Now
there's a loophole.
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consistent with an effort to limit or downsize government.
According to a contrary view, as articulated by tax expenditure theorists, and as
currently applied under federal budgetary requirements, a tax incentive that departs
from the "normal" revenue-raising income tax structure or income tax base
constitutes a "tax expenditure." As acknowledged in the tax expenditure budget, the
tax system plays a role as a funding and delivery mechanism for certain government
programs in addition to its revenue-raising function.
Although tax expenditures are less transparent as budgetary items than
appropriations, tax expenditure theorists argue that their use does not necessarily
result in smaller government. Tax expenditures create additional management
burdens on the tax system and administrators, requiring tax administrators to issue
regulations, rulings, and conduct audits of "spending" programs outside their basic
area of expertise. 186
Tax expenditure theory distinguishes between across-the-board tax cuts and
targeted tax breaks. Because the tax rate structure is viewed as part of the "normal"
income tax structure by tax expenditure theorists, an across-the-board tax rate
reduction would not be classified as a "tax expenditure." By contrast, a special tax
deduction, credit, or rate applied to the profits of certain industries (from oil
exploration, for example) would be classified as a tax expenditure. Such preferences
or incentives generally violate the tax norms of equity and neutrality. However,
because they serve an expenditure function, not a revenue-raising tax function, 187 tax
expenditure theorists argue that they should be evaluated using criteria applicable to
other government spending programs.
The differing views of ownership and "subsidy" in the debate about tax
expenditures obscure underlying disagreements about the role of government and
how its costs should be allocated. The debate masks a basic disagreement about the
scope of the government's power to tax.
Drawing the line between public and private resources by reference to
"ownership" suggests a continuing entitlement to the fruits of one's labor or
property 8 8 and a rejection of the government's coercive power to collect funds for
186 SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX ExPENDrruRES, supra note 153.; see, e.g., Alstott, supra note
184, at 546-70; Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income
Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REv. 871, 874-909 (1993); George K. Yin et al., Improving the
Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit
Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 225 (1994).
187 See discussion supra Part l.B. 1 (discussing cases interpreting the Origination Clause,
which requires that all bills for "raising revenue" originate in the House of Representatives).
188 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT §§ 27, 28, at 305-07
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690). In discussing the extent of legislative
power, Locke emphasized that the power to tax derives from the consent of the people, given by a
majority of the people or their representatives. Id. §§ 140-42, at 380-81.
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redistributive purposes. 189 If one accepts the government's power to tax for such
purposes, however, the notion of private ownership loses its force in this context. The
issues instead center on choices regarding the provision of public goods, distributive
justice, and the collective financing of certain redistributive governmental programs
rather than on preserving pretax distributions of resources. 190
The more pertinent question becomes how the political system defines the tax
base to secure certain social outcomes, and how it determines what each individual or
business must transfer to the public sector. The practical question of whether the
funds are actually collected by the government and then disbursed through spending
programs, or whether the collection step is skipped by virtue of a special tax break for
a particular individual or industry so that a benefit can be delivered through the tax
system, raises issues of administration, management, and legislative process rather
than of political or philosophical justifications for the government's power to tax.
D. The Tax Baseline in a Hybrid Tax World
Although the conflicting views about private ownership and public subsidies
illustrate the stark differences in assumptions between those who accept the idea of
tax expenditures and those who reject it, most of the theoretical controversy about the
tax expenditure concept among tax experts has focused on the difficulty of defining
the "normal" tax base.
The reconsideration of tax baseline issues by the Bush Administration is related
to the policy question of whether the income tax should be replaced by a tax on
consumption, 19 1 and to the technical issue of how the baseline should be defined
under our current system: a hybrid of income and consumption tax features. 192
Instead of focusing on the government's power to tax, these questions raise issues
about what should be taxed and on the relative values one might place on neutrality
and equity norms.
In theory, the tax base choice between an income or consumption tax is largely a
question of how savings or changes in wealth should be treated by the tax system.193
189 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-82 (1974) (adopting a theory of
property rights under which a person has an entitlement to property if acquired in accordance with
"justice in acquisition" or with "justice in transfer" from someone else who was entitled to it).
190 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 76-95.
191 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 96-97.
192 E.g., Michael S. Knoll, Designing a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1791, 1798-1810 (1994) (summarizing the features of a consumption tax and an income tax);
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1145, 1147, 1174-75 (1992) (arguing that a hybrid may be an appropriate policy goal); see Glenn,
supra note 139 (quoting Treasury official on the nature of the reconsideration).
193 This is related to the argument, traced back to Hobbes, that wealth is not appropriated for
private purposes until withdrawn for personal use from the "common pool" of national savings.
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This question has been debated by economists and political theorists for over a
century, 194 and has received renewed political and scholarly attention in the United
States during the last few decades. 195
Economic income has been defined as the market value of rights exercised in
personal consumption plus the net change in wealth during the taxable period. 196 An
income tax imposes a "double" tax on savings or investment: once when the
investment asset is purchased with the taxpayer's after-tax earnings and again when
the investment incrementally increases in value or generates additional earnings. 197
The income tax code frequently departs from this ideal of taxing "accretions" to
wealth because of pragmatic considerations, as exemplified by its general failure to
See NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 87-91 (1955); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the
Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REv. 961,962 (1992). As explained by Hobbes:
[T]he equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed than
of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that he which
laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged
than he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets, seeing the one hath no more
protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are laid upon
those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth, nor is the
commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 228 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett 1994) (1651).
194 HOBBES, supra note 193; see also, e.g., RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
21-25 (rev. ed. 1976).
195 E.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 157,
157-75 (1997) (describing different approaches to tax reform, including improving the existing tax
base, modifying the tax base by adopting a consumption tax such as the Flat tax or the USA tax,
and rationalizing the relationship between taxes); see, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1140-50 (1974); Michael J.
Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1575, 1578-80 (1979);
see also ROBERTE. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLATTA 40 (2d ed. 1995); U.S. DEP'TOFTHE
TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS].
196 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the Haig-Simons definition of
income).
197 As John Stuart Mill observed, income that is earned and consumed is subject to a single
level of tax, and income that is earned and invested is subject to two levels of tax. JOHN STUART
MnU- PRINCIPLES OF POLmCAL ECONOMY 550-57 (J. Laurence Laughlin ed., 1884).
In 2002, Pamela F. Olson, the then incoming Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, focused in part on the double tax on savings when asked at her Senate Finance Committee
nomination hearing what priorities ought to be followed for tax reform:
Well, I think that radical simplification may be the first step. But I do think that we need
to look at some of the issues related to our double taxation of savings, because we have too
many disincentives built into the system right now with respect to the taxation of savings. So,
I think it is important for us to bear that in mind as we look at reform for the future.
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Committee Hearing on Olson Nomination (Aug. 1, 2002), TA
NoTms TODAY 154-27, Aug. 9, 2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 154-27.
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tax the unrealized appreciation of property 198 and the imputed income from property
or services. 199
A consumption tax, on the other hand, taxes personal consumption and exempts
net savings from the tax base. Personal consumption taxes can be implemented in the
form of general retail sales taxes, value added taxes, or taxes on luxury purchases. As
tax scholars have pointed out, they also can be implemented within the overall
structure of a personal "income" tax in two different ways: 1) by allowing a deduction
for savings and by including dissavings in the tax base, called the "cash flow" or
"qualified account" method; 2°° or 2) by taxing income as it is earned but exempting
from tax the return of invested capital and the yield on investments, called the "tax
prepaid" or "yield exemption" method. 20 1
Our current income tax system has been described as a hybrid of income and
consumption design features.202 With regard to savings, the hybrid nature of the
current system can be illustrated by the treatment of personal savings in regular
interest-bearing bank accounts as compared with the special tax treatment accorded
certain types of retirement savings. The treatment of a personal savings account
comports with the model income tax "double" tax on savings: the nondeductible
deposits are made with after-tax dollars and the interest earned on the account is
taxable. 203 By contrast, the special tax treatment of individual retirement accounts and
qualified pension plans comports with a consumption tax model.2°4
For example, certain Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and qualified
198 I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b) (2003) (defining gain from the sale or other disposition of property
as the amount realized over the adjusted basis of the property). But see I.R.C. § 1296 (2003)
(election of mark-to-market for marketable stock); I.R.C. § 1256 (2003) (mark-to-market
requirements for certain futures contracts and options).
199 Imputed income includes the market value of services a taxpayer performs for himself.
See SIMONS, supra note 170, at 52. It also includes the annual rental value of property owned by
the taxpayer, such as the house she lives in or the car she drives during the year. See BLUEPRINTS,
supra note 195, at 7, 89.
2 0 0 See Andrews, supra note 195, at 1116; BLUEPRINTS, supra note 195, at 113-14.
201 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 195, at 115 (using the two different methods as design
features in a model consumption tax); Graetz, supra note 195, at 1586 (arguing for caution in
treating the two methods as equivalent due to the number of unrealistic assumptions that must be
met for the equivalence to hold); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931,938 (1975). The equivalence was first stated
by E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT AND PuBuc Poucy: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 301 (1948).
202 See, e.g., William D. Andrews & David F. Bradford, Savings Incentives in a Hybrid
Income Tax, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OFA HYBRID INCOME-CONsuMPnON TAX 269,
270 n.4 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988).
203 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2003).
204 See Jonathan Barry Forman, The Tax Treatment of Public and Private Pension Plans
Around the World, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 299, 305-11 (1997).
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pension plans allow a deduction for qualified retirement contributions, permit tax-free
buildup of investment earnings, and impose tax on the distributions made after
retirement (or dissavings).205 This pattern comports with the treatment of savings
under a "cash flow" or "qualified account" method of taxing consumption.
Roth IRAs,206 on the other hand, follow the "tax prepaid" or "yield exemption"
consumption tax method. Contributions to the account are made with after-tax
dollars207 and the investment returns and distributions are tax-free.20 8
Because these provisions depart from the "normal" income tax treatment of
savings (no deduction for contributions and tax on earnings), they are currently listed
as "tax expenditures." 209 As tax-favored forms of savings, they provide incentives for
individuals to save for their retirement years during their working years.
E. Example: Public Debate Regarding Savings and Investment
The use of a "normal" income tax as the tax baseline for purposes of the tax
expenditure budget means that the consumption-based savings features in the code
will be identified as "tax expenditures." If the Administration's policy goal is to move
toward a consumption-based tax system, 210 either incrementally or through more
comprehensive tax reform,211 the revenue losses identified in adopting features
inconsistent with an income tax create budgetary and political obstacles to achieving
such a goal. Hence, adoption of either 1) a modified "hybrid" reference tax
baseline 212 based on current hybrid features of the code,213 or 2) a consumption tax
205 See I.R.C. §§ 219, 401, 402, 501 (2003). For qualified pension plans, the employer is
permitted a deduction for the contribution to the plan and the contribution is excluded from the
employee's income. See I.R.C. § 404 (2003).
206 See I.R.C. § 408A (2003).
207 See I.R.C. § 408A(c) (2003) (allowing no deduction for contributions).
208 See I.R.C. § 408A(d) (2003) (excluding qualified distributions from gross income).
209 See J. CoMM. TAx EXPENDrURE ESTIMATES MOR FY 2002-2006, supra note 132, at 26,
27 (listing under income security, net exclusion of pension contributions and earnings, and
separately tabulated for employer plans, individual retirement plans, Keogh plans, etc.).
2 10 The shift to a consumption-based tax system has been linked to certain privatization goals.
See Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax:
Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J.
TAx POL'Y 1, 18-23, 33, 85 (1996) (suggesting that consumption tax proposals should be viewed
as an attempt to reduce the size of government by lowering tax burdens on capital and by reducing
tax revenues).
211 The various consumption tax proposals (flat tax, USA tax, etc.) proposed during the
1990s as replacements for the income tax code did not attract sufficient political support for
enactment by Congress. See Warren, supra note 195, at 174-75.
212 See supra note 139 and text accompanying notes 174 and 202.
213 Although comments by Treasury officials after the submission of the first Bush budget
appeared to suggest that such a baseline might be considered as an option, the second budget did
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baseline could make such a transformation somewhat easier to achieve. The
associated revenue losses could entirely disappear under either alternative baseline.
The Bush Administration took an incremental approach to tax reform by
proposing expansion of various types of tax-favored private retirement savings,214
education savings accounts, 215 and health savings accounts.216 These types of
provisions expand tax-favored savings beyond a primary focus on retirement savings
to include private savings for other purposes. Removing a level of tax on a broader set
of savings accounts moves the tax system closer toward a consumption base tax
system. Over time, that shift could have an impact on the level of retirement savings
for lower and moderate income taxpayers by altering the existing incentives.217
Furthermore, expanded private retirement provisions, combined with
recharacterization of their revenue cost for purposes of the tax expenditure budget,
may make it politically more feasible to reform social security along lines favored by
the Bush Administration. 218
not list a hybrid baseline as an option, but instead pointed to the development of two separate
baselines: one based on comprehensive income and one based on consumption. See supra note
139 and text accompanying notes 140-43.
2 14 See Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38 (creating a new nonrefundable tax credit for up to $2,000 of elective contributions to qualified
pension plans and IRAs for taxable years 2002-2006, increasing contribution limits and catch-up
contributions for IRAs, increasing contribution and benefit limits for qualified plans, and providing
a tax credit for certain administrative expenses for new pension plans adopted by small businesses).
215 See id. (increasing the annual limit on contributions to Coverdell education savings
accounts from $500 to $2,000); I.R.C. § 530 (2003).
2 16 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAxATION, 107TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REvENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FIscAL YEAR 2003 BuDGET PROPOSAL 53-57 (J.
Comm. Print 2002); see also I.R.C. §§ 220, 223 (2003) (health savings accounts added for taxable
years beginning after 2003 by Title XII of the Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003)).
217 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAErz & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECuRrrY 265 (1999)
(observing that "[t]he effectiveness of incentives for employer-sponsored pensions also depends
significantly on the presence or absence of other tax-preferred alternatives" and that"vulnerability
to unrelated tax policy shifts" has been suggested as a reason for mandatory employment-related
pension plans or mandatory contributions to individual retirement accounts); Daniel I. Halperin,
Special Tax Treatmentfor Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means
of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 46-50 (1993)
(discussing the impact of income tax incentives and other factors on retirement savings).
2 18 President George W. Bush's State of the Union Address, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
109, 110 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ (proposing
offering "younger workers a chance to invest in retirement accounts that they will control and that
they will own"); see also Specifics on the The President's Plan to Strengthen Social Security, at
http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/ (Feb. 28, 2002) (including tax provisions
aimed at expanding ownership of retirement assets).
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IV. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVELY FINANCED PERFORMANCE
Tax incentives are subject to less monitoring on an ongoing basis than other types
of discretionary spending by the government. Tax provisions are not subject to the
appropriations process and, thus, generally are not subject to spending caps or to
annual appropriations from Congress. 219 Unless enacted with a sunset provision, tax
incentives become a potentially permanent part of the tax code, remaining in effect
until amended or repealed.220 Tax incentives typically are not subject to the types of
alternative forms of monitoring possible in negotiated relationships, such as in
governmental contracting.221
The tax-writing committees provide oversight of Internal Revenue Service
implementation of hundreds of programs provided through the tax code, covering
many program areas, from agriculture to welfare-related provisions. However, tax-
delivered subsidies largely escape performance management requirements currently
imposed by Congress on other federal agency programs. 222
The discussion below is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the
expiration of certain budgetary monitoring mechanisms applied to tax incentives and
describes the need for a new consensus. The second section discusses the need for
performance monitoring of tax incentives. The use of tax incentives without
219 As explained by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, tax expenditures "are
similar to those direct spending programs that are available as entitlements to those who meet the
statutory criteria established for the programs." J. COMM. TAX EXPENDrURE ESTIMATES FOR FY
2004-2008, supra note 132, at 2; see also STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX ExPENDrrURES FOR FISCAL YEARs 2001-2005, at 2 n.5 (J. Comm.
Print 2001) (noting that a few tax expenditures have statutory limits and giving the example of the
tax credit for low-income rental housing, which is available only to those who have received
statutorily limited credit allocations from State housing authorities). See generally Edward A.
Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARv. L.
REv. 379, 400-09 (1998) (describing the varied and overlapping nature of tax and direct spending
programs; comparing them to each other by reference to factors including permanence, eligibility,
and quantity, that is, whether the expenditures are capped like appropriations or uncapped like
entitlement programs).
220 Sunset provisions automatically terminate unless they are extended by Congress. The
periodic extension of a set of "expiring" tax provisions has become an established feature of the tax
legislative process. See, e.g., The Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, §§ 500-
512, 113 Stat. 1861, 1918-25 (extending many expiring tax provisions through December 31,
2001). An across-the-board sunset provision was enacted as part of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. The Act expires after 2010, unless Congress extends it. Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150(2001).
221 See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 7, at 550-51 (discussing negotiated relationships).
222 See Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program Oversight
Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 751, 817-25
(2000) (arguing that tax expenditures should be subject to the performance management
requirements applied to discretionary expenditures).
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accountability for results is inconsistent with the Administration's rhetoric of
governmental reform, which has emphasized citizen-centered, results-oriented,
market-based reforms. 223
A. Collective Financing: The Budget Process
Budget process restrictions, adopted in 1990224 and now expired, are under
review by the Administration and by Congress.225 The budgetary surpluses reported
in the last part of the 1990s eliminated much of the deficit-related consensus that led
to the adoption of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA).226 Although the BEA
22 3 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT: CREATING A BETTER GOVERNMENT: IMPROVING GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 11-14 (2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/budget.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET, CREATING A
BETTER GOVERNMENT: FY 2002] (listing priorities for those reforms). The FY 2003 Budget
expanded on those priorities by setting forth five areas for improved management performance.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTrVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BuDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT: GOVERNING WITH ACCOUNTABILITY: OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 43-
54 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/Pdf/bud09.pdf (including
strategic management of human capital, competitive sourcing, improved financial performance,
expanded e-government, and budget and performance integration). A color-coded scorecard kept
score on agency progress towards those goals. Id. at 48-50; see also THE PRESIDENT'S
MANAGEMENT AGENDA, supra note 21, at 3-30.
The FY 2004 Budget presented a new Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), with a
stated goal of rating one-fifth of all federal programs each year, on four areas of assessment:
"purpose and design, strategic planning, management, and results and accountability", with
"overall qualitative ratings that range from Effective, to Moderately Effective, to Adequate, to
Ineffective." OFFICE OFMGMT. & BuDGET, EXECUTIvE OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT, BUDGETOFTHE
UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT: RATING THE PERFORMANCE OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS: FISCAL YEAR
2004, at 47-53 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/budget/performance.pdf. As reported in the
FY 2005 Budget, about forty percent of federal programs (including both mandatory and
discretionary programs) have been initially assessed under PART. See BUDGET, FY 2005, supra
note 144, at 9, 12 (about forty percent of programs evaluated were found to be effective or
moderately effective, twenty-five percent were found to be adequate or ineffective, and forty
percent were unable to demonstrate results). With regard to the Treasury Department, the only tax-
related program listed as evaluated under PART is the earned income credit program, a refundable
credit requiring direct federal outlays, which received a rating of "ineffective." Id. at 19.
224 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 [hereinafter BEA] (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C.).
225 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 283.
226 Testimony of Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Before the House Budget Committee on the Budget Enforcement Act, TAX NOTES TODAY 125-32,
June 27,2001, LEXIS 2001 TNT 125-32 [hereinafter OMB Director's House Budget Committee
2004]
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requirements were nominally in effect through fiscal year 2002 for most categories of
spending,227 the rules had less impact as deficits declined.228 Congress largely
ignored them in enacting the major tax cut in 2001.229 The following subsections
discuss the BEA rules, the Administration's publicly stated position with regard to
BEA-type procedures, and the need for a new consensus in Congress to replace them.
1. BEA and the Budget Process
Under the BEA,230 budget tradeoffs were made within the two separate packages
of 1) discretionary spending programs and 2) tax and entitlement programs. 23 1 The
Testimony) (stating that "the Administration believes that the BEA should be modernized in order
to guide budget decisions in an era of surplus").
227 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 10201-205, 111 Stat. 251,
697-702 (extending discretionary spending limits and PAYGO requirements until October 1,
2002); Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, §§ 8101-03, 112 Stat.
107, 488-92 (1998) (extending limits to 2003 for expenditures for highways and mass transit);
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-291,
114 Stat. 922 (adding a new category for conservation spending with limits on budget authority
and outlays for 2002-2006, with limits on discretionary spending until 2006). According to recent
budget documents, "[blecause the BEA itself expired after 2002, the categories in later years will
apply to budgets for those years only if an extension of the BEA is enacted and those categories are
retained." BuDGEr, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 460.
228 See BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243 (stating that "Congress and the previous
Administration began to skirt the budget enforcement mechanisms" after the reporting of budget
surpluses in 1998). "In 2001 alone, appropriations exceeded the discretionary spending levels set in
the BEA, requiring a $95.5 billion increase in the cap for that year to accommodate the increase. In
2001, PAYGO requirements for $17 billion in spending were also waived." Id. See also BUDGET,
FY 2003, supra note 140, at 291 (explaining that the PAYGO process requires OMB to maintain a
"scorecard" that shows the cumulative net cost impact of PAYGO legislation, and that for 2002,
net costs of $130.3 billion were removed from the PAYGO scorecard, thus skirting PAYGO
constraints).
229 See Rojas, supra note 181 (reporting that Dan L. Crippen, director of the Congressional
Budget Office, told House Budget Committee members that the $1.35 trillion tax cut had already
been added to the PAYGO scorecard and would likely be waived because of the surplus). For a
description of the mechanisms used by Congress to bypass BEA requirements in legislation
enacted after 2000, see Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Process, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 919-20 (2002) (including classifying legislation as
"emergency" legislation, and thus effectively removing it from the PAYGO scorecard, and
directing the Office of Management and Budget to set the scorecard back to zero).
230 See supra note 224.
231 See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget
Process, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 387, 397-405 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Rethinking] (describing
the two-part division of the budget into discretionary programs, containing subdivisions
corresponding to the jurisdiction of the thirteen appropriations subcommittees, and tax and
entitlement legislation, falling within the jurisdiction of the tax-writing committees).
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BEA's limitations on these two parts of the budget are discussed in greater detail
below, beginning with discretionary spending limits, followed by an explanation of
the procedures applied to tax and entitlement programs. Across-the-board reductions
of non-exempt spending, known as "sequestration," enforced compliance with the
BEA's requirements. 232
The BEA limited discretionary spending through spending caps and certain
statutory enforcement procedures.233 The spending caps provided a form of budget
discipline within the overall budget process. The congressional budget committees
drafted budget resolutions, which established a total amount that could be expended
for discretionary programs during the year.234 House and Senate appropriations
committees allocated those totals among their subcommittees. Under the spending
caps, new discretionary programs competed for funds with all discretionary programs
within certain broad categories and then with all the existing programs within the
purview of the relevant appropriations subcommittee.235
The budget process kept score of spending and provided for various procedural
mechanisms to enforce the spending caps set by the budget resolution. Under the
BEA, if appropriations exceeded the statutory spending caps, a sequestration
"reduce[d] spending for most programs in the category by a uniform percentage," 236
eliminating the excess in programs that are funded in the spending category in which
the overage occurred.
The BEA controlled new tax and entitlement legislation237 through restrictions
known as "pay-as-you-go" or "PAYGO" requirements. 238 The BEA did "not cap
mandatory spending239 or require a certain level of receipts,"240 but instead adopted a
232 See BUDGEr, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243.
233 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 645,901 (1994 & Supp. 1IH 1997).
234 The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution, which is not signed by the President and
is not law. Its spending limits for discretionary programs could differ from the caps set by the BEA.
The budget resolution is enforced through parliamentary points of order. See Elizabeth Garrett, The
Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 COLuM. L. REv.
702, 715-17 (2000) [hereinafter Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process] (describing the
budget committees and the budget resolution, the reconciliation process, and budget summits as
centralized decision-making procedures).
235 See Garrett, Rethinking, supra note 231, at 399.
236 See BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 443. However, the BEA "specifies special rules
for reducing some programs and exempts some programs from sequestration entirely." Id.
237 PAYGO did not apply to increased mandatory spending (which includes entitlement
spending) or decreases in tax receipts that are not the result of new laws. Id.
2 3 8 Id.
239 Mandatory spending, sometimes called "direct spending," refers to spending that is not
controlled through appropriations. It includes the largest entitlement programs, such as social
security and Medicare, as well as means-tested entitlement programs (including Medicaid, food
stamps, and other programs for low-income families and individuals), and other mandatory
spending (including interest payments and federal retirement and insurance programs). Entitlement
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PAYGO principle of "revenue neutrality" for new legislation.
The congressional budget resolution set the amount of revenue to be raised by
taxes during the year, provided for the debt limit, and, as noted above, set
discretionary spending limits. The tax-writing committees proposed a mix of tax rates
and other tax changes that would meet revenue targets specified in the budget
resolution. 24 1 After the expiration of the BEA, PAYGO restrictions continued to
apply on a limited basis through internal congressional budget procedures. 242
Under the BEA's PAYGO provisions, tax changes resulting in revenue loss had
to be paid for by tax increases or by offsetting revenue gains from modifications to
existing tax provisions or in cuts to the entitlement programs under the jurisdiction of
the tax-writing committees.243 However, they could not be offset by cuts in
discretionary spending programs. PAYGO was enforced by its own independent
sequestration and enforcement provisions. 244
Although the BEA slowed the growth of new federal spending during a period of
substantial federal deficits,24 5 and thus played an important budgetary control role, the
spending is largely determined by eligibility and benefits formulas.
24 0 BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 443.
241 See Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process, supra note 234, at 715-17.
242 E.g., Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, TAx NOTES TODAY 72-
17, § 505, April 11, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 72-17 (adopting a PAYGO point of order in the
Senate). The rule may be waived by a supermajority vote of sixty Senators. Id. See Block, supra
note 229, at 884-85 (describing the Senate's internal PAYGO mechanisms adopted as point-of-
order rules incorporated into yearly budget resolutions); see, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal
Constitution With Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 471, 479-80 (1999).
243 See Block, supra note 229, at 884-85. See generally COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 106TH CONG., 2D SESS., 2000 GREENBooK BACKGROUND MATERIAL
AND DATA ON PROGRAMS wrrTHN THE JURISDICION OFTHE COMMITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS vii
(Comm. Print 2000) (including jurisdiction over tax provisions as well as major entitlement
programs, including social security, Medicare, and numerous other programs providing social
welfare benefits).
244 See 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994). The procedures were as follows:
The BEA sequestration procedures require a uniform reduction of mandatory spending
programs that are neither exempt nor subject to special rules. The BEA exempts social
security, interest on the public debt, Federal employee retirement, Medicaid, most means-
tested entitlements, deposit insurance, other prior legal obligations, and most unemployment
benefits. A special rule limits the sequestration of Medicare spending to no more than four
percent, and special rules for some other programs limit the size of a sequestration for those
programs. As a result of exemptions and special rules, only about three percent of all
mandatory spending is subject to sequestration, including the maximum amounts allowed
under special rules.
BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 443.
245 Bud Newman, U.S. Budget: Pay-As-You-Go Rules Are Irrelevant, Ways and Means
Staffer Tells ABA, 94 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-3 (May 15, 2000) at
http://pubs.ban.com/ip/BNA/DTR.NSF (reporting observations by congressional staff that the
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BEA increased the separation between tax expenditures and discretionary programs
for purposes of policy analysis. It created incentives to channel new spending through
the "tax side" of the budget, 246 and resulted in greater tax code complexity. 247
However, at the same time, PAYGO arguably increased the transparency of the tax
legislative process. 24 8
2. The Need for a New Consensus
Any revival of the BEA, to be effective, must represent a consensus in Congress
about both the need for budget discipline and the rules for constraint. No such
consensus has emerged since the BEA's expiration in 2002, although growing
deficits may prompt reconsideration.
The Bush Administration's first budget submission proposed the extension and
modification of BEA requirements by raising the discretionary spending caps and
extending them through 2005.249 In addition, the Administration proposed extending
and setting new PAYGO requirements for entitlement spending and tax
legislation:25
0
This Administration proposes to extend the PAYGO requirements. The President's
budget sets aside the Social Security surplus and additional on-budget surpluses for
debt reduction and contingencies. These levels ensure the President's tax plan and
his Medicare Helping Hand and modernization reforms are fully financed by the
budget surplus eliminated the congressional consensus that kept PAYGO on the books, that the
discretionary spending caps had more influence than PAYGO, and that the latest budget restriction
to have an impact on potential tax code changes was the understanding that neither tax cuts nor
entitlement spending could result in the use of the social security surplus).
246 See Burman, supra note 183, at 409. Unlike the offsets available to discretionary spending
proponents, the potential offsets available to proponents of new tax expenditures were not limited
to a subset of programs related by subject matter within the jurisdiction of the appropriations
subcommittees. Instead they included all those tax and entitlement measures under the jurisdiction
of the tax-writing committees. Garrett, Rethinking, supra note 231, at 401. It is possible, however,
that discretionary funding advocates might have been able to target unrelated offset options earlier
in the budget committee allocation process. See Roin, supra note 135, at 629.
247 See, e.g., Charles E. McClure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax
Simplification/Complication, 45 TAx L. REV. 25,28-30 (1989) (describing the interaction between
budget policy and tax policy); see also MICHAEL J. GRAE74 THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE
INCoME TAX 186-88 (1997) (describing, in general, the adverse effects of budget politics on tax
legislation in the decade following 1986).
248 See Garrett, Offset Requirements, supra note 165, at 504 (arguing that budget rules
provide a mechanism to harness interest group conflict, giving lawmakers an opportunity to review
and modify tax subsidies and encouraging them "to provide reasons for their decisions, thus
increasing their accountability to the electorate").
249 BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 243.
250 Id.
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surplus. The Administration will work with Congress to set new PAYGO
requirements that accommodate these proposals. 25 1
The Administration's proposal thus apparently proposed a minimum threshold of
protecting the Social Security Trust Fund Surplus, 252 suggesting a consensus point
used by Congress in the past when PAYGO restrictions were skirted.253 The Director
of the OMB later suggested the following mechanism to implement BEA restrictions:
Once this minimum threshold is set, new discretionary spending "caps" and "paygo"
requirements could be determined on an annual basis through the vehicle of a Joint
Budget Resolution. In fact, if one considers the various changes to the BEA since
1990, it could be argued that the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch have,
from time to time, entered into agreements that amounted to de facto joint budget
resolutions. I refer here to the Executive-Legislative Summit agreements of 1990,
1993, and 1997. We should consider regularizing this step as an annual process.254
If PAYGO were extended and modified along the lines first suggested by the
Administration, it would provide a continuing examination of tax incentives from a
budgetary perspective. However, the effectiveness of any BEA extension would also
depend upon Congress's honoring of the spirit of the agreement over a period of
years.
The Bush Administration's second budget, submitted during a "War on
Terrorism" and an economic "slowdown that was worsened by the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001," observed that "budget surpluses for the short term have
disappeared; and the general purpose discretionary caps and PAYGO requirements of
BEA no longer apply."255 The Administration pledged to work with Congress during
the next session to develop enforcement mechanisms, including future discretionary
spending limits and PAYGO requirements for entitlement spending and tax
legislation "that are consistent with the needs of the country. 256
In addition, the Administration proposed a joint budget resolution to set overall
levels of spending, receipts, and debt. The joint resolution, which would require the
President's signature, would have the force of law and "be enforced by sequesters
requiring automatic across-the-board cuts by category to offset any excess spending,
similar to the BEA. 257 This mechanism would require the President and Congress to
agree "on overall fiscal policy before individual tax and spending bills are enacted,
251 Id. at 443.
252 See OMB Director's House Budget Committee Testimony, supra note 226.
253 See Newman, supra note 245.
254 OMB Director's House Budget Committee Testimony, supra note 226.
255 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 283.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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and avoid the 'train wrecks' at the end of the year that frequently occurs under the
current process."258 Alternatively, the budget submission suggested that enforcement
could involve extension of the BEA. If so, the Administration "would support
discretionary caps that are consistent with the discretionary levels proposed in the
2003 budget and PAYGO requirements that would carry out the 2003 budget's
proposals for mandatory spending and receipts." 259 The Administration's third
budget renewed its pledge to support renewal of discretionary caps and PAYGO, with
discretionary caps and PAYGO requirements to be proposed at levels sufficient to
support its budget proposals. 260
Significantly, the budget submitted in the last year of Bush's four-year term
outlined a new position on revenue provisions. The Administration's budget
submission supported renewal of discretionary spending caps, consistent with its level
of fiscal year 2005 budget proposals, and reimposition of PAYGO for mandatory
spending only (including entitlement programs such as Social Security).261
Accordingly, if the Administration's position were adopted by Congress, PAYGO
would not be applied to tax legislation. The budget submission also reiterated its
support of ajoint budget resolution with the force of law, permitting the President to
be engaged earlier in the budget process.262 In addition, it advocated enactment of a
"constitutional" line item veto.263 As of this writing, the BEA had not been extended
and Congress had reached an impasse on PAYGO. 264
3. Relationship to Privatization
A reconceptualization of the tax expenditure concept could alter the types of tax
provisions viewed as "revenue-losing" provisions. Most significantly, if a
consumption tax baseline were used for purposes of defining tax expenditures, tax
provisions favoring retirement savings would not be listed as revenue losers. This
258 Id. at 283-84.
2 5 9 Id. at 284.
260 BUDGET, FY 2004, supra note 59, at 315-16.
261 BUDGET, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 215-16.
262 Id. at 218.
263 Id. at 218-19.
264 Because of the impasse on PAYGO, the Republican controlled House and Senate have
not yet completed action on the 2005 fiscal year budget resolution. Four Senate Republicans joined
the Senate Democrats to back PAYGO, and refused to support any fimal budget plan that failed to
contain a multi-year PAYGO provision for tax cuts. Republican negotiators then agreed on a one-
year budget, setting the 2005 fiscal year discretionary spending cap at $821 billion. Although the
budget resolution conference report passed narrowly in the House, it did not pass in the Senate,
where the four Republicans joined the Democrats to block its passage. See Bud Newman, Senate
Democrats Unsure Whether to Fight Unprecedented GOP Move to AdjustBudget, 139 DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA) G-8 (July 21, 2004).
2004]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
would place the political debate about individual retirement accounts or education
savings accounts in a less transparent political environment by obscuring the political
tradeoffs.
If BEA-style PAYGO and discretionary caps were revived, tax and entitlement
offsets could once again become a feature of the tax legislative process. If
discretionary spending caps return and PAYGO is fully revived, the pressure to
channel spending to the tax side of the budget could continue, depending upon the
restrictiveness of the caps adopted. The policy separation between the two budget
packages of discretionary spending and tax and entitlement programs would continue
unabated, unless the budget resolution incorporates a more structured oversight
mechanism to permit coordinated review of tax expenditures as well as discretionary
spending programs.
As indicated in its fiscal year 2005 budget submission, however, the
Administration rejected PAYGO as applied to tax legislation. 265 In the past, the
Administration had supported such an extension of BEA, at least in principle if not in
practice. 266 Exempting tax legislation from PAYGO while imposing budget process
restrictions on discretionary and mandatory spending would shift even more spending
to the tax side of the budget.
B. Private Performance: Accountability Gaps
New challenges in achieving accountability accompany the shift in public
management 267 from Progressive-era and New Deal-type centrally managed federal
programs and command-and-control regulatory models to decentralized and market-
based models. In this decentralized environment, a management system based on
results makes more sense, some argue, than one based on hierarchical process or input
controls on the management of equipment, staff, and budgets.268 The federal
government has been developing a management framework designed to assess the
performance of traditional federal programs or services provided by government
agencies as well as for programs or financial assistance provided through various
alternative, more private or decentralized mechanisms. This framework could provide
a useful model for evaluating the effectiveness of tax incentives. So far the model has
been applied to traditional governmental programs but not to tax-delivered programs.
2 6 5 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
2 6 6 See supra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
267 See generally Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155,160-64,
201-07 (2000) (describing the shift from hierarchical structures, providing specific examples of the
contracting out of governmental services, and discussing the challenges posed to administrative
law by the shift).
268 E.g., DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE
ENTRERNEuRiAL SPIRIT is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 139 (1992).
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1. Performance Management Requirements
Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),269
Congress requires federal agencies to set goals for program performance, to measure
performance results, and to report the results on an annual basis to the President and
Congress. 270 The agencies must develop multi-year strategic plans for their program
activities, 271 establish measurable performance goals, 272 develop annual plans to help
them meet their performance goals,273 and prepare annual reports on their progress
toward meeting their goals.274
The GPRA, which grew out of regulatory initiatives begun during the Reagan
Administration, was first introduced during the Administration of President George
Herbert Walker Bush and enacted into law during the Clinton Administration. 275 The
GPRA initially created pilot programs to assess the costs and benefits of the
performance requirement and to test the specifications for performance plans.
Congress required the OMB to report the results of the performance management
2 69 Govermment Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
[hereinafter GPRA] (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.).
270 In enacting the GPRA, Congress found that "[f]ederal managers are seriously
disadvantaged" in efforts "to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient
articulation of program goals and inadequate information on program performance" and that
"congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight are seriously handicapped
by insufficient attention to program performance and results." Id. § 2(a)(2)-(3). The purposes of
the GPRA, among others, are to "improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability
by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction" and to "improve
congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective information on achieving statutory
objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending...
Id. § 2(b)(3), (5).
271 5 U.S.C. § 306(b) (2000).
272 The performance plans must "establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or
assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity .. " 31
U.S.C. § 11 15(a)(4) (2000). An "output measure" is more specifically defined by the GPRA as
"the tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort and can be expressed in a quantitative
or qualitative manner ... " Id. § II 15(g)(3). An "outcome measure" is defined as "an assessment
of the results of a program activity compared to its intended purpose ..... Id. § 111 5(g)(2).
273 Id. §§ 1 105(a)(28), 1115(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
274 Id. § 11 15(a)(4)-(6).
275 See Walter Groszyk, Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993, in OECD, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT: CONTEMPORARY ILLUSTRATIONS
71, 74 (1996) (listing as immediate antecedents of the GPRA, a Reagan administration OMB
report, legislation proposed by Senator Roth (R., Del.) based on state and local experiences over
the previous decade, and program performance measures and information required under the Chief
Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (codified beginning at 31
U.S.C. § 501)); see also William V. Roth, Jr., Reinventing Government: Maintaining the
Momentum, PUB. MANAGER, Winter 1993-94, at 15, 15-17 (describing bipartisan reform efforts).
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pilot studies to the President and Congress by May 1, 1997,276 and since then, the
requirements have been more broadly implemented. 277
The Agency's performance plans and reports cover each of their program
activities listed in the annual budget.278 The term "program activity" is defined as "a
specific activity or project as listed in the program and financing schedules of the
annual budget of the United States Government. '279 The program and financing
schedules, designed primarily for use by the Appropriations Committees, are arranged
according to each separate branch of government, with the executive branch
organized by agency.280 Tax-delivered programs are not listed in the Treasury
Department's program and financing schedule unless they involve direct outlays
(such as refundable tax credits).
The GPRA also requires the president's annual budget submission to include a
government-wide performance plan. 281 Although the statute does not specify that
analysis of tax expenditures be included in the government-wide performance
plan,282 the legislative history of the GPRA requests that the government-wide
performance plans contain a"schedule for periodically assessing the effects of... tax
expenditures in achieving performance goals." 283 As specified by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, the assessments "should consider the
relationship and interactions between spending programs and related tax
expenditures." 284
276 31 U.S.C. §§ 1118(c) (2000).
277 See id. §§ 1105(a)(28), 1115(a)(2000 & Supp. 2004); id. § 1116(a)(2000).
278 Id. § 1115(a), (g)(6).
2 7 9 Id. § 1115(g)(6).
280 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BuDGET, ExEcunvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STAiES GOvERNMENT: APPENDIX: DETAILED BuDGEsnMATs: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 4
(2000) (detailing the information provided by the "program and financing schedule," including
"obligations by program activity" and explaining that "[t]he activity structure is developed for each
appropriation or fund account to provide a meaningful presentation of information for the
program").
281 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(28) (2000) (requiring that the president's budget submission to
Congress include a "performance plan for the overall budget as provided for under section 1115").
Programs are listed in the performance plan under certain functional categories used in the budget
(including national defense, agriculture, housing and commerce, education, training, employment
and social services, and income security), according to the program's major purpose. BUDGET, FY
2002, supra note 135, at 445-46 (discussing functional classification).
282 31 U.S.C. § I 105(a)(28) (2000). In past years, the government-wide performance plan has
included tax expenditures in a listing of federal resources by function (national defense, energy,
agriculture, commerce and housing, etc.). That pattern continued in the Bush Administration's first
budget submission. See BuDGET, CREATINGABETIERGOvERNMENr. FY 2002,supra note 223, at
15-18 tbl.1-l (2001) (listing spending, credit activity, and tax expenditures by budget function).
283 S. REP. No. 103-58, at 28 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 327, 354.
284 Id.
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In its 1997 GPRA report to Congress,285 the OMB set forth an initial framework
for tax expenditure review, emphasizing that developing a "comprehensive, accurate,
and flexible" framework "to reflect the objectives and effects of the wide range of tax
expenditures will be a significant challenge. '286 OMB assigned Treasury lead
responsibility for pilot evaluations of selected tax expenditures "[t]o explore methods
for tax expenditure evaluation" and "to gather experience on a cross-section of
issues."287
Treasury's initial pilot study selected three tax expenditures 288 to study the
evaluation methods and resource needs connected with evaluating the relationship
between tax expenditures and performance goals. Treasury found that the information
needed for analysis was not available.289 Assessment of data needs and availability
from governmental and non-governmental sources, it concluded, should prove useful
to compare the effectiveness of tax expenditures with "outlay, regulatory and other
tax policies as means of achieving objectives." 290 It therefore planned studies
focusing on the availability of data needed to assess the effects of "selected significant
tax expenditures, primarily those designed to increase savings." 291
As part of this effort, Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis and the IRS Statistics of
Income Division developed "the specifications for a new data sample which will
follow the same individual income tax filers over an extended period of time."'292 The
sample will attempt to capture the effect of changes in tax law over an extended
period of time to "enhance our ability to analyze the effect of tax expenditures
designed to increase savings." 293
The Bush Administration's first budget submission reported that the
specifications had been developed, and that the sample, beginning with tax returns
filed in 2000 for the tax year 1999, will follow the same taxpayers "over a period of at
least ten years." 294 In addition, it reported that "[o]ther efforts by OMB, Treasury, and
285 See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text (relating to statutory requirement).
2 8 6 OFFICEOFMGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICEOFTHE PRESIDENT, THE GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND REsuLTs ACT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS FROM THE DMECTOR
OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET IV (May 1997).
287 Id.
288 OFFIcE OFMGMT. & BUDGET, ExEcuTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGETOF UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERsPECIvES: FIsCAL YEAR 2000, at 121 (1999) (listing the
tax exemption for worker's compensation benefits, the tax credit for non-conventional fuels, and
the tax exclusion for certain amounts of income earned by Americans living abroad).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYIncAL PERsPECIvES: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 124 (2000).
2 9 3 Id.
294 BUDGET, FY 2002, supra note 135, at 77.
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other agencies to improve data available for the analysis of savings tax expenditures
will continue over the next several years." 295 The second Bush Administration budget
reported that the first year of the panel sample was drawn from tax returns filed for
the tax year 1999, and that the "sample will capture the changing demographic and
economic circumstances of individuals and the effects of changes in tax law over an
extended period of time."296 It remains to be seen how the Administration's
reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept will affect the data collection effort
with regard to savings-related tax expenditures.297
Unlike the glacial pace of assessment of tax-delivered programs, the evaluation of
mandatory and discretionary federal programs was proceeding on the relatively brisk
schedule of about one-fifth of all mandatory and discretionary federal programs per
year.298 The Bush Administration implemented its performance assessment of these
collectively financed federal programs as part of its overall program of performance
management review. Those assessments included no tax-delivered programs other
than the earned income tax credit program, which as a refundable tax credit, involves
direct federal outlays.299 The goal of the Administration's performance and budget
integration initiative was to have program assessment information routinely
considered by Congress and the executive branch in making management and
funding decisions.300
2. Relationship to Privatization
The Bush Administration's reconsideration of the tax expenditure concept places
into doubt efforts to incorporate tax expenditures into the performance review
process. Without performance information, Congress will have little basis on which to
evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives adopted in furtherance of domestic policy
goals. If so, discretionary spending programs will be subject to much higher standards
of review than tax-based incentive programs. That may, in turn, lead policy
entrepreneurs to favor tax incentive programs, fostering increased privatization
through the use of tax incentives.
Nevertheless, such a two-tiered system would be inconsistent with the
Administration's reform rhetoric about making government accountable for "results."
Without a comparable means of evaluating tax-delivered incentives, tax incentives
2 9 5 Id. at 78.
296 BUDGET, FY 2003, supra note 140, at 113.
297 The FY 2005 budget merely reports that the study of savings related tax expenditures is
on-going. BUDGET, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 300-01 (reporting that efforts to improve data
collection will continue).
298 See supra note 223 (describing the Administration's PART initiative).
299 BuDGEr, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 19. See supra note 223 (referencing PART
assessment of the earned income credit).
300 BUDGEr, FY 2005, supra note 144, at 9.
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will be given a "free ride" from accountability. Failure to apply performance review
requirements on the very type of market-based, decentralized programs that justify the
adoption of performance-based standards presents a challenge to the stated rationale
for the requirements--that of increasing the effectiveness of government programs
and expenditures.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress coordinates its taxing and spending decisions through the budget
process, collectively determining what will be financed and performed through
government and what will be left to private choice. As the public sector shifts from
centralized, hierarchical public administration models to alternatives based on
decentralization, devolution, and privatization, increased attention should be paid to
the financing dimension of privatization decisions.
General tax reduction results in more individual financing, which when
combined with decreased government spending and private sector performance, leads
to a smaller sphere of government action. By contrast, government contracting,
outsourcing, and voucher programs retain collective financing but delegate
performance to the private sector. Like government contracting, outsourcing, or
vouchers, targeted tax incentives are financed collectively, through higher general tax
rates (or higher borrowing costs) and involve legislative choices about the use of
public resources. Unlike vouchers, which are funded through appropriations, targeted
tax incentives rely on private market responses to altered price levels for tax-favored
activities.
The Bush Administration's reconsideration of the tax expenditure budget
coincided with a crucial time of change in centralized governmental structures.
During such a period of change, there is a need for more, not less, political
transparency and accountability. The use of tax incentives can lead to a loss of
political transparency and accountability, as well as a shift in decision making from
democratic deliberation about resource allocation to more individualized market
choices. The governmental funding choices inherent in tax incentive design should
not be obscured by equating targeted tax incentives with overall tax reduction.
Tax incentives can be an effective means of delivering government subsidies, and
accordingly, their use could lead to more cost-effective and minimally intrusive
government programs. On the other hand, increased use of tax incentives burdens the
Internal Revenue Service with administrative and enforcement responsibilities for
subsidy programs outside of its traditional revenue collection function, costs that are
not always considered when new tax incentives are enacted.
The difficulty of monitoring the governmental provision of vouchers or tax-based
assistance illustrates the double-edged relationship between individual choice and
democratic accountability. The legislative decision-making process focuses on the
financing of the programs and on their initial design. Once in place, these programs
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do not have the same management accountability structures or the visibility of
programs performed by government agencies. Although vouchers and tax benefits
may enlarge individual private market choices, they limit democratic deliberation and
decision making about their effectiveness. In addition, their use may paradoxically
lead to increased governmental regulation of organizations and private firms that
participate in such programs.
Administrative lawyers are engaged in studying new ways in which regulation,
contracts, and contract monitoring may respond to the accountability problems
created by increased "contracting out" or privatizing of governmental services. A
parallel effort to study ways in which increased monitoring of tax credits and
incentives can be achieved needs to be undertaken. Tax incentives generally do not
involve negotiated relationships between government and private contractors, but
typically involve tax reporting to the Internal Revenue Service and oversight
jurisdiction by the tax-writing committees. The delivery of subsidies through the tax
system can mask governmental funding levels and allocations and obscure
accountability for outcomes being funded. Although the first steps in that direction
have been taken, much more is needed to ensure accountability for such collectively
financed private choices.
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